Description:Field of Invention
The present invention isrelating to a system that Vehicular networks have the potential to minimize the accidents on roads and improve the security of drivers.
The Objectives of this Invention
The invention's major goal is to preserve the location privacy of vehicles, this work proposes an anonymous beacon generation mechanism.To ensure high authentication messages by detecting the Sybil attack and compromised RSU, this work proposes an efficient authentication scheme and a secret maintenance mechanism. To detect Sybil attacker attack and a compromised RSU, this supports a temporarily authorized certificate that includes the trusted certificate and secret key trajectories to the vehicles for communication.
Background of the Invention
In recent years, (US2023/10528760B2) Described a system which performs 2PC individually on the data that is public during the privacy maintenance of its input data on cloud-based privacy-preserving navigation operations between various parties. In (CN2021/110930747B), The invention realizes the cloud service (CAVH) and its interaction with the CAVH component which provides various functions like perception, planning, control, communication, privacy protection, security and so on.In (US2017/0222990A1), In one aspect, a method where certificates are selected for identifying the vehicle location, messaging between vehicle-vehicle, reusing of certificates in a pool. In other aspect, a method is provided for all the above said only to the amount of messaging activity. In (US2017/9692604B2), Method and system for distribution of key by the nodes it could be trusted for a vehicular AdHoc network, the certificates that are issued by Certification authority for the corresponding certificates where the nodes of the said network hasat least one pair of public-Private keys. These nodes entering the network region, set of keys request need to be sent from an RSU node which is within the range and vice versa. Therefore, the two nodes establish a secure connection without further communication by deriving a shared secret i.e., a cryptographic hash function of the shared keys between the two nodes.
Despite the several advantages of VANET, it raises a set of challenges, especially security and privacy due to the inherent characteristics. Lack of authenticated information that is shared in vehicular communication is likely to be prone to several attacks and service abuses. Thus, it poses serious threats to drivers (Kamran et al., 2015). The work in (Chenxi et al., 2008) proposes a symmetric random key-set method to reduce the overhead in VANET communication. Asymmetric cryptography is a public key cryptography in which the vehicles employ a public and private key pair to encrypt and decrypt a safety message respectively. Hence, the public and private keys are mathematically linked. However, an attacker can eavesdrop the keys of neighboring vehicles due to the unreliable communication medium in VANET. In (Park et al., 2009), consecutive time stamp series with corresponding RSU’s public key is used for identifying the attacker. However, the RSUs employ the same signature for a long time to provide time stamps to vehicles. As a result, an attacker infers the victim vehicle’s location information using RSU signature. In some VANET applications (Hao et al., 2011), an attacker may forge multiple pseudonyms, and it exploits these pseudonyms to pretend as multiple vehicles in a different location. The work in (Hsin et al., 2010) presents a comprehensive message authentication technique that allows the message authentication in intra and inter RSU range and the hand-off within the diverse RSUs. The vehicles exploit various common session keys in the range of different RSUs. It allows the message authentication for vehicles in different ranges of RSUs. The authentication method scheme balances the computation and communication overhead, and also provides security against the attack. Position verification relies on roadside infrastructure, like base stations. Footprint (Chang et al., 2012) designs hidden location trajectories using two properties such as unlinkability and a signer ambiguous. The hidden location trajectories can preserve the location privacy of vehicles at the same time the footprint detects a Sybil attack using the social relationship among trajectories. A P2DAP in (Zhou et al., 2011) proposes a new technique to detect a Sybil attack in vehicular networks. The P2DAP distributes the computational complexity from the TCA to RSUs. Hence it releases only a limited amount of information by using hash collisions. In P2DAP, RSU detects a Sybil attack through passive overhearing and also, it preserves the vehicle’s location privacy. However, it does not provide precise solutions to detect compromised RSU, and an attacker can obtain the coarse-grained hash key from the compromised RSU.
Summary of the Invention
The proposed invention will be helpful for the all the people, as the report of World Health Organization (WHO) in 2010 shows that 1.24 million people have been killed around world and more than 50 million people injured in road traffic accidents each year. The people aged between 15 and 44 years have dispatched 59% of global road traffic deaths. In low and middle-income countries approximately 91% people are being killed due to a motor vehicle crashing. More than half of a global death has happened among pedestrians and two-wheeler drivers. These losses are miserable, and it is essential to improve the road safety using vehicular communication. In VANETs, the vehicles can exchange some information such as safety warnings and traffic information with each other to improve the safety of drivers and also make the driving comfortable. Thus, it effectively prevents the accidents and traffic congestion during the journey. However, the mortality rate has increased day by day due to the increase in the use of vehicles. Hence, secure and reliable communication of safety-critical data promptly is essential for VANET, but it is tough in the presence of the Sybil attacker on the network. Reliable delivery of safety packets without leaking the privacy information of vehicles in a VANET is a significant challenge due to the nature of Sybil attack. Thus, it is essential to mitigate the effect of the Sybil attack by integrating authentication mechanisms, when providing reliable service for delivering safety packets fast in a highly dynamic VANETs.
Detailed Description of the Invention
The proposed invention consists of three types of defense mechanisms such as Preserving Location Privacy through Anonymous Beaconing (PLPAB), Sybil Attack-Resistant Location Privacy (SARLP), and system for detecting misbehavior vehicles with location Privacy (SYBIL-CAP) to ensure privacy and security in VANETs. The contributions of the proposed works are:
The proposed PLPAB system prevents the location privacy of the user in VANET using anonymous beacon generation and location verification. If a vehicle is inauguratedfrom its home network, it accomplishes the registration process with LS. The LS provides a triplet to the vehicle for encrypting the beacon message in a secure manner, and it also computes a mysterious value to the corresponding vehicle using a triplet. Each vehicle in VANET frequently broadcasts an anonymous beacon for afixed period to inform their location to other vehicles. The beacon receiving vehicles send a beacon report message, that containing report table and signal strength to the LS over a secure channel. The beacon-report message comprises some information such as signal strength of the receiving beacon, beacon generation and receiving time, the speed of the vehicle, location of the reporter and encrypted location of the vehicle. The LS decrypts the encrypted beacon message using triplet for deciding the location of the corresponding vehicle that broadcasts a beacon. The report information is stored in a report table. To validate the beacon message, the LS divides the road topology into segments for discovering the actual location of the vehicle. LS considers traffic measurements to avoid unnecessary beacon generation. The LS compares both the determined location information and report table location information. If the locations are mismatched, the LS announces the beacon generating vehicle to be malicious. Moreover, the LS determines the attacker and prevents the location privacy of the user.

The proposed SARLP system provides a reliable authentication mechanism to improve the location privacy of a user. Block Diagram of SARLP is depicted in fig.2. Since the authentication mechanism progressively sends all the reported events to the TCA, it examines the trusted temporary certificate of each vehicle. In the SARLP system, the authentication mechanism hides the real identity of the user and provides a trusted temporary certificate and a key to the users. The RSUs are divided into groups under the TCA. When a vehicle crosses the first RSU, it receives the trusted temporary certificate. To reduce overhead, the vehicle employs the same trusted certificate to cross the RSU group. For strong privacy, an RSU generates a secret random number along with the signature and provides the secret random number to the corresponding vehicle. In the secret maintenance mechanism, the corresponding RSU and the vehicle maintain the random number secretly. The RSU-vehicle pairs are unaware of the secret random number each other. When communication occurs between vehicles, the sender has to send the trusted certificate to the receiver, including the sequence of secret random numbers to prove that it is an authenticated vehicle for communication. The receiver verifies the secret random number at the interference range of two RSUs. The genuine RSU determines the compromised RSU by matching the secret random number with its list. If any mismatching is detected, genuine RSU reports it to the TCA. Otherwise, it allows vehicles to initiate communication. Thus, the SARLP system provides high location privacy to vehicles against compromised RSU.
The working model of preserving location privacy in VANET typically involves the following components and features:Pseudonymous Identity: Each vehicle in the VANET is assigned a pseudonymous identity, which changes periodically to prevent long-term tracking. This identity is used for communication purposes, but it does not reveal the actual identity or location of the vehicle.Sybil Attack Prevention: Measures are implemented to prevent Sybil attacks, where an adversary creates multiple fake identities to disrupt the system's functioning. Sybil detection techniques can be employed to identify and block malicious entities.Secure Location Verification: Techniques such as secure multi-party computation (SMC) may be used to verify the authenticity of location information shared among vehicles without revealing the actual locations.
6 Claims &2 Figures
Brief description of Drawing
In the figure which are illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention.
Figure 1, The Block diagram of PLPAB system
Figure 2, The Block Diagram of SARLP , Claims:The scope of the invention is defined by the following claims:

Claim:
1. A system/method to preserve the privacy of the user through anonymous beacon distribution. The PLPAB includes two mechanisms such as anonymous beacon generation and location verification mechanism, said system/method comprising the steps of:
a) The vehicle information (1) stored in this, that will share to RSU’s (2). Each vehicle registers its identity with the Location Server (LS) (3) to get triplet. A triplet contains a short term key for beacon encryption and decryption and two random integers for counter measurements. The vehicle and LS maintain a time-dependent mysterious value (4).
b) The developed SARLP system is to improve the location privacy of vehicles against Sybil attack (5). To achieve this objective, the SARLP system includes two mechanisms such as effective authentication (6) and secret maintenance (7). The final will come as attack free communications (8).

2. As mentioned in claim 1, To hide the sender information, the beacon generation mechanism instructs the vehicles to generate anonymous beacon that only contains the encrypted location of the vehicle for sharing safety-related messages among them.
3. As mentioned in claim 1, In location verification mechanism, the beacon receiving vehicle measures the signal quality and attaches the signal quality with a beacon report message. The LS receives a beacon report message from beacon receiving the vehicle, and it discovers the original location of the vehicle and compares that location with the beacon message for detecting attackers.
4. As mentioned in claim 1, To enable authenticated inter-vehicle communication and to reduce the impact of location privacy attack, the efficient authentication mechanism hides the real identity of users by providing a trusted temporary certificate that comprises a temporary key and ID.
5. As mentioned in claim 1, To reduce the overhead and to minimize the workload on TCA, the SARLP groups the RSUs under TCA and it allows a vehicle to use the same temporary certificate for an RSU group.
6. As mentioned in claim 1, In secret maintenance mechanism, each RSU-vehicle pair maintains a secret random number to ensure high security. The secret maintenance mechanism detected the Sybil attack and compromised RSU by verifying the sequence of the secret random number at the intersection of two RSUs.