Abstract: Methods and apparatus for automatically providing secure network infrastructure over non secure network infrastructure such as by automatically generating IPSec tunnels through non secure networks terminating the IPSec tunnels at a boundary device and creating appropriate services to bridge traffic between the IPSec tunnels and a secure network. Various embodiments provide rapid provisioning of secure network infrastructure a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment adapted to particular customer requirements and various business methodologies.
METHOD, SYSTEM AND APPARATUS PROVIDING SECURE
INFRASTRUCTURE
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Patent Application Serial No.
61/314,448, filed on March 16, 2010, entitled METHOD, SYSTEM AND
APPARATUS FOR IPSEC INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISIONING,
MANAGEMENT AND APPLICATIONS THEREOF, which application is
incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The invention relates generally to communication networks and, more
specifically but not exclusively, to provisioning secure services over a non
secure transport layer.
BACKGROUND
Various networks such as Fourth Generation (4G) wireless networks
support large numbers of wireless subscribers running one or more
applications. Traffic is packetized and transported via IP networks according
to multiple network elements utilizing different transport technologies, applied
quality-of-service (QoS) policies and so on. Such networks are inherently
complex and present new challenges to network service providers and the
network management tools they rely upon to ensure consistent delivery of
high-quality services to their mobile subscribers.
Provisioning and monitoring a secure infrastructure layer such as
IPSec infrastructure layer in conjunction with the transport layer upon which it
is built is complex and prone to error. Transport networks are initially
provisioned to support the bandwidth deemed necessary for various customer
goals. An IPSec infrastructure is then built on top of the provisioned network
as secure networking is needed.
The transport network provisioning process and IPSec infrastructure
provisioning process are independent of each other. This independence leads
to inefficiency and lack of mutual awareness between these two layers, which
causes problems during troubleshooting, updating, network management and
other functions. For example, any failure within transport network elements
below the IPSec layer will impact the functionality of the IPSec layer, such as
by degrading Virtual Private Remote Networking (VPRN) of an end subscriber
or end consumer.
SUMMARY
Various deficiencies in the prior art are addressed by embodiments for
providing secure network infrastructure over non-secure network
infrastructure. Various embodiments provide rapid provisioning of secure
network infrastructure, a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment adapted to
particular customer requirements, various business methodologies and the
like.
Various embodiments operate to configure elements within an existing
non-secure network environment to enable the services necessary to support
secure tunneling between access points for users accessing a secure network
via a non-secure network, such as Level 3 (L3) Virtual Private Networking
(VPN) services, VPRN (Virtual Private Routed Network) service, IES (Internet
Enhanced Service) service and/or other services. When configured, the
secure network (e.g., a corporate network) is protected with respect to users
accessing the corporate network through non-secure networks such as the
Internet (e.g., IPSec connections to corporate or other secure networks).
In a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment, a router associated with a
boundary device operates as a secure client to a secure network, while
various users operate as secure clients to the router. In this manner, IPSec
traffic associated with the users is terminated at the boundary device of the
Secure Gateway rather than at a termination point associated with the secure
network. By avoiding the termination of multiple user IPSec tunnels within the
secure network, the security of the network is enhanced, the provisioning
complexity is reduced, and the corporate network may retain existing services
and protocols (e.g., L2 VPN).
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The teachings of the present invention can be readily understood by
considering the following detailed description in conjunction with the
accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 depicts an exemplary architecture according to one
embodiment;
FIG. 2 depicts a more detailed view of network protocols proximate a
boundary card within a router in the architecture of FIG. 1;
FIG. 3 depicts a high-level block diagram illustrating a service creation
and correlation process performed by the exemplary management system of
FIG. 2;
FIG. 4 depicts a high-level block diagram of a wholesale video service
architecture;
FIG. 5 depicts an exemplary management system suitable for use in
the various embodiments;
FIG. 6 depicts an exemplary wireless communication system including
a management system according to an embodiment; and
FIGS. 7-8 depict high-level block diagrams illustrating a discovery and
correlation process performed by a management system according to various
embodiments.
To facilitate understanding, identical reference numerals have been
used, where possible, to designate identical elements that are common to the
figures.
DESCRIPTION
The invention will be primarily described within the context of particular
embodiments, however, those skilled in the art and informed by the teachings
herein will realize that the invention is also applicable to other technical areas
and/or embodiments.
Generally speaking, the various embodiments enable, support and/or
improve the provisioning and monitoring associated with building a secure
infrastructure layer (e.g., an IPSec infrastructure layer) on top of a provisioned
network transport layer to provide secure networking services as such
services are needed.
Various embodiments are also applicable within the context of Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) Virtual Private Network (VPN), Dynamic Multipoint VPN,
Opportunistic Encryption and the like. Various embodiments benefiting from
such services will also be discussed, including access to a secure corporate
network via one or more non-secure core and/or access networks, providing
video on demand (VOD) and other television/broadcasting services and the
like.
The various embodiments are suitable for use in any access or core
network environment supporting secure networking techniques such as IPSec
tunneling, including existing and future wireline and/or wireless IP networks or
networks used IP-type control protocols. For example, various systems,
apparatus, methodologies, functions, programs, topologies and so on
described herein with respect to long term evolution (LTE) related
environments (typically accessed via eNodeBs) are also applicable to other
environments, such as those accessed via digital subscriber lines (DSLs),
cable modems and other existing and future access technologies. It is also
contemplated by the inventors that other various LTE components may also
use secure tunnels in accordance with the invention, such as the MME, SGW,
PCRF (DSC) and/or PGW. Generally speaking, any component of an LTE
network or other network may benefit from having a secured tunnel through
the Security Gateway (SEG). Although it is true that it is the eNodeB that will
be the most common client of this functionality.
Various embodiments operate to configure elements within an existing
non-secure network environment to enable the services necessary to support
secure tunneling between access points for users accessing a secure network
via a non-secure network, such as Level 3 (L3) Virtual Private Networking
(VPN) services, VPRN (Virtual Private Routed Network) service such as
2547bis, IES (Internet Enhanced Service) service and/or other services.
When configured, the secure network (e.g., a corporate network) is protected
with respect to users accessing the corporate network through non-secure
networks such as the Internet (e.g., IPSec connections to corporate or other
secure networks).
In a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment, a router associated with a
boundary device operates as a secure client to a secure network, while
various users operate as secure clients to the router. In this manner, IPSec
traffic associated with the users is terminated at the boundary device of the
Secure Gateway rather than at a termination point associated with the secure
network. By avoiding the termination of multiple user IPSec tunnels within the
secure network, the security of the network is enhanced, the provisioning
complexity is reduced, and the corporate network may retain existing services
and protocols (e.g., L2 VPN).
Providing A Secure Infrastructure Layer
Generally speaking, the various embodiments enable, support and/or
improve the provisioning and monitoring associated with building a secure
infrastructure layer such as IPSec infrastructure layer on top of a provisioned
network transport layer to provide secure networking services as such
services are needed, such as providing access to a secure corporate network
via one or more non-secure core and/or access networks.
The various embodiments described herein are suitable for use in any
access or core network environment supporting secure networking techniques
such as IPSec tunneling, including existing and future wireline and/or wireless
IP networks or networks use IP-type control protocols. For example, various
systems, apparatus, methodologies, functions, programs, topologies and so
on described herein with respect to long term evolution (LTE) related
environments (accessed via eNodeBs) are also applicable to other
environments, such as those accessed via digital subscriber lines (DSLs),
cable modems and other existing and future access technologies.
Various embodiments operate to configure elements within an existing
non-secure network environment to enable the services necessary to support
secure tunneling between access points for users accessing a secure network
via a non-secure network, such as Level 3 (L3) Virtual Private Networking
(VPN) services, VPRN (Virtual Private Routed Network) service, IES (Internet
Enhanced Service) service and/or other services. When configured, the
secure network (e.g., a corporate network) is protected with respect to users
accessing the corporate network through non-secure networks such as the
Internet (e.g., IPSec connections to corporate or other secure networks).
In a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment, a router associated with a
boundary device operates as a secure client to a secure network, while
various users operate as secure clients to the router. In this manner, IPSec
traffic associated with the users is terminated at the boundary device of the
Secure Gateway rather than at a termination point associated with the secure
network. By avoiding the termination of multiple user IPSec tunnels within the
secure network, the security of the network is enhanced, the provisioning
complexity is reduced, and the corporate network may retain existing services
and protocols (e.g., L2 VPN).
FIG. 1 depicts a simplified architecture according to one embodiment.
Specifically, simplified architecture 100 of FIG. 1 represents a portion of a
larger network (not shown) in which two users communicate with each other
via respective secure paths through non-secure networks, each secure path
initiated at an access point of a non-secured network and terminating at a
secure corporate network which operates to connect the users to form thereby
a secure path between the users.
Referring to FIG. 1, a first user 1101 accesses a first non-secure
network 8301 via a respective access device 1201 , and a second user 1102
accesses a second non-secure network 1302 via a respective access device
1202. Traffic is transported between the first access device 1201 and a first
routing device 1401 by one or more Iinks/paths within the first non-secure
network 8301 , and between the second user 1102 and a second routing
device 1402 by one or more Iinks/paths within the second non-secure network
8302.
Depending upon the type of non-secure network 130 to be accessed
by a user device 110, the corresponding access devices 120 may comprise
digital subscriber line (DSL), cable modem, eNodeB or other access devices
or aggregation points.
Each of the routing devices 140 includes or is associated with a
boundary device 142 or similar termination/bridging mechanism to terminate
traffic from the non-secure network 130, terminate traffic from a secure
network 140, and bridge the terminated traffic between the non-secure 130
and secure 140 networks as appropriate.
The routing device 140 may comprise any router or switching device or
combination thereof capable of providing the routing, bridging and/or other
functions described herein. In one embodiment, the routing device 140
comprises an Alcatel-Lucent 7750 service router having installed therein an
IPSec boundary card 142.
Thus, in one embodiment, each of the user devices communicates via
a link between a respective access device 120 and the non-secure side of, for
example, a respective IPSec boundary card in a respective router. The secure
network sides of the IPSec boundary card communicate with each other via
the secure corporate network.
Packets traveling within the secure network do not need IPSec
tunneling to travel there through. Generally speaking, the secure corporate
network utilizes L3 VPN or other secure infrastructure to transport traffic so
that further encryption of such traffic within the corporate network is
unnecessary (in fact, further encryption might render the encrypted packets
unreadable).
Packets traveling through the non-secure network are conveyed via an
IPSec session (encrypted) which is supported by various transport layer
hardware, software, protocols and the like.
The boundary device 142 is used to create/terminate a secure
(encrypted) service through the non-secure network using L3 VPN, VPRN and
the like. That is, a secure IPSec session is created between the user device
(having its own respective IP address) and the boundary device (which also
has its own respective IP address). In this manner, the boundary device
communicates packets from the secure (encrypted) service provided via the
non-secure network to the secure corporate network for propagation to,
illustratively, users within the secure corporate network or users outside of the
secure corporate network (e.g., the second user of FIG. ) .
Optionally, the boundary device also supports Internet Enhanced
Service (IES) for the secure IPSec session. The boundary device 142 will be
described in more detail below with respect to FIG. 2.
FIG. 1 also depicts a management system (MS) 170 that provides
management functions for managing the non-secure network 130. The MS
170 may communicate with non-secure network 130 in any suitable manner.
An exemplary management system suitable for use as MS 170 of FIG. 1 is
depicted below and described with respect to FIG. 5.
In FIG. 1, the dashed lines represent the path of an encrypted IPSec
session. It is noted that both of the first and second users are associated with
a respective encrypted IPSec session terminating at respective routing
devices 140. The boundary device optionally strips off encryption from
packets before passing them to the secure network since the packets may
otherwise become unintelligible.
While FIG. 1 depicts only two users, it will be appreciated that more
than two users may be in communication with each other and that each user
may be in communication with more than one other user.
While FIG. 1 depicts each user 110 accessing a respective non-secure
network 130 via a respective access device 120, the users may in fact be
accessing a common non-secure network by respective or common access
devices. Moreover, a user may access multiple non-secure networks
simultaneously, such as a mobile device user accessing a 3G/4G/xG network
and a local 802.1 1x network or hot spot.
While FIG. 1 depicts a single non-secure network between a user 110
and routing device 140, in various embodiments the user traffic will be
transported via multiple non-secure networks, such as via an access network
and a core network.
It should be noted that one or many users may be connected to the
secure network via one or more routing devices 140 operating as,
illustratively, Secure Gateways (SEGs). Moreover, in various embodiments
one or more of the routing devices 140 may be accessible from multiple
networks. For example, in various embodiments both of the unsecured
networks 130 depicted herein with respect to FIG. 1 may access both of the
routing devices 140. It may be the case that a particular unsecured network
130 will prefer a particular routing device 140 based upon cost considerations;
however, the ability to access multiple routing devices 140 provides
redundancy and/or resiliency within the context of the various embodiments.
In various embodiments, an Alcatel-Lucent versatile service module
(VSM) is used to allow cross connection of services.
The above-described embodiments are supported by routing devices
operating as Secure Gateways to the secure network 140. For example, a
router including a boundary device (e.g., a 7750 router having multiple
boundary cards, switching modules and the like) may be configured as a
security gateway product which, when installed within a service provider
network, provides and/or supports the various secure transport and
management functions described herein.
FIG. 2 depicts an exemplary security gateway (SEG) according to one
embodiment. Specifically, FIG. 2 depicts a security gateway 200 including a
first plurality of input/output interfaces denoted as I/O interfaces 210, a
switching fabric 220, a boundary device 230 and a second plurality of I/O
interfaces 240.
When provisioned according to the various embodiments, the security
gateway (SEG) 200 provides termination, routing and bridging functionality
within the context of the various embodiments discussed herein. That is,
encrypted user traffic is transported through a non-secure network 130 to/from
the security gateway 200 via IPSec tunnels terminated at a first portion 230A
of the boundary device 230. Unencrypted user traffic is transported through a
secure network 150 to/from the security gateway 200 and terminated at a
second portion 230B of the boundary device 230.
In the embodiment of FIG. 2, the first and second portions of the
boundary device 230 comprise respective first 230A and second 230B
boundary cards. In other embodiments, a single boundary card is used. In
other embodiments, still other boundary device mechanisms are used.
For example, while FIG. 2 depicts the use of two boundary cards
deployed in, illustratively, a HA and load-balancing mode, more or fewer
boundary cards may be used within the context of the various embodiments.
Specifically, a single boundary card is capable of connecting the non-secure
network services to the secure network services. For example, both ingress
and egress IPsec Interfaces may be on the same boundary device or
boundary card since, in various embodiments, these IPsec Interfaces are
virtual interfaces that merely provide the required functionality to support the
IPSec service.
The first plurality of input/output interfaces is denoted as I/O interfaces
2101 , 2102, 2103 and so on through 2 1ON, where each of the /O interfaces
includes a plurality of ingress ports, egress ports, buffers and the like (not
shown). Encrypted user traffic is communicated between the first plurality of
I/O interfaces 210 and first portion 230A of the boundary device 230 via,
illustratively, a first portion 2201 of the switching fabric 220.
The second plurality of input/output interfaces is denoted as I/O
interfaces 2401 , 2402, 2403 and so on through 240M, where each of the I/O
interfaces includes a plurality of ingress ports, egress ports, buffers and the
like (not shown). Unencrypted user traffic is communicated between the
second plurality of I/O interfaces 210 and second portion 230B of the
boundary device 230 via, illustratively, a second portion 2202 of the switching
fabric 220.
In the embodiment of FIG. 2, the switching fabric 220 is depicted as
including first and second portions for switching traffic between the boundary
device 230 and, respectively, first plurality of input/output interfaces 210 and
second plurality of input/output interfaces 220. The switching fabric 220 may
be implemented without separate portions and/or omitted altogether. For
example, in various embodiments a very few number of second plurality of
input/output interfaces is used since the SEG 200 may be deployed to serve
the needs of a very few number of secure networks (e.g., several corporate
clients at a specific location).
To support encrypted user traffic via IPSec tunnels terminated at the
first portion 230A of the boundary device 230, it is necessary for the boundary
device to be configured to support those protocols enabling such IPSec
tunneling, such as L3 VPN, IES, VPRN and the like as previously noted.
FIG. 3 depicts a flow diagram of a method for automatically
provisioning secure transport infrastructure over non-secure transport
infrastructure. The method 300 of FIG. 3 may be triggered in response to a
service request or other indication of a need to provide a secure service to a
customer (e.g., a corporate customer having a secure network in
communication with a non-secure network of a service provider).
At step 310, a secure network is selected for protection. For example,
referring to FIGS. 1 and 2, the secure network 150 may comprise a corporate
network associated with a corporate customer of a service provider. In this
case, the corporate customer wishes to give one or more users secure access
to the corporate network, where the one or more users will be accessing via
non-secure networks. The secure network to be protected may be included
within a customer service request, profile information within a service request,
entered directly by operations personnel and the like.
At step 320, a Secure Gateway (SEG) is selected. For example,
referring to FIGS. 1 and 2, a routing device 140 proximate the corporate
network 150 and having a boundary device 142 may be selected for
provisioning as a Secure Gateway 200. Referring to box 325, the specific
SEG selected for use may comprise one of a plurality of available IPSeccapable
Gateway devices. The SEG may be automatically selected
according to one or more of the following criteria: cost (e.g., lowest cost in
terms of shortest path or other measure), proximity to customer, proximity to
service provider, utilization level (available bandwidth or processing
resources) and/or other criteria. Various other mechanisms for selecting a
particular Gateway to be used as a Secure Gateway SEG may also be
employed. In a NOC embodiment, a list of potential SGs may be visually
presented to the operator in terms of the above criteria to assist in the
selection.
At step 330, one or more boundary devices such as one or more IPSec
cards or groups in the one or more SGs is selected for use in protecting the
secure network. Multiple boundary devices may be used to provide
redundancy, resiliency or otherwise handle large bandwidth traffic.
At step 340, a secure networking service such as a L3 VPN service is
selected, created or otherwise provided to connect the selected boundary
device (e.g., an IPSec card) and the secure network. The selected, created
or otherwise provided service is associated with the portion of the boundary
device 130 facing the secure network, such as the second portion 230B of
boundary card 230. For example, if the secure network 150 is coupled to the
selected gateway device via something other than a L3 VPN (e.g., an L2
VPN), then an appropriate L3 VPN service is created such that IPSec
functionality/infrastructure may be connected to the secure network 150.
At step 350, a service such as an IES, VPN and/or VPRN service to
host public IP addresses for use by secure clients such as IPSec clients is
selected, created or otherwise provided. The public IP addresses hosted by
the IES, VPN and/or VPRN service is used by IPSec clients to initiate the
creation of IPSec tunnels. The selected, created or otherwise provided
service is associated with the portion of the boundary device 130 facing the
non-secure network, such as the first portion 230A of boundary card 230. For
example, a user device 110 will need an address to use for terminating an
IPSec tunnel, which address will be provided by the IES, VPN and/or VPRN
service associated with the first portion of the boundary card.
At step 360, an IPSec interface is created to pair or associate within a
single group the public traffic of the non-secure network and secure traffic
associated with the network to be protected such that the secured network
receives public traffic from appropriate users via the appropriate tunnel(s),
and conveys traffic to appropriate users via the appropriate tunnel(s). The
public traffic comprises traffic conveyed by IPSec tunnels terminated at the
portion of the boundary device facing the non-secure network(s), while private
traffic comprises traffic terminated at the portion of the boundary device facing
the secure network. Those IPSec tunneled paths conveying traffic associated
with the secure network are grouped with secure network traffic paths.
At step 370, each service pair is is associated with a respective
encapsulation identifier so that identified traffic associated with different
service pairs (protected, distribution; secured, public) may be segregated. In
this manner, the public/private paths are bridged via the boundary device to
provide secure public access to appropriate or authorized users of the secure
network.
In various embodiments, the groups operate to bundle boundary cards,
which give the IPsec functionality to IPsec Interfaces that are created in the
context of an IPsec group. In various embodiments, there are two IPsec
Interfaces per groups, one public and one private. The encapsulation on the
two interfaces must match for a binding of one Public L3VPN and a Private
L3VPN. This encapsulation allows the assignment of several service bindings
to a single IPsec Interface pair (e.g., such as providing a VLAN at a port to
segregate the traffic from one network or user to another).
The method 300 of FIG. 3 provides a provisioning mechanism in which
access to a secure network owned by a company or other customer of a
service provider may be automatically provided by the service provider. In
operation, many access points within a non-secure network may be
authorized to access the secure network. Each of these access points will
communicate traffic to and from any SEG via a secure tunnel. In various
embodiments, multiple SGs may be used to protect the secure network. In
these embodiments, each of the various access points will be associated with
a particular SEG, and each SEG may be used to terminate one or more
tunnels from the various access points.
In some embodiments, the particular SEG associated with a particular
user is selected in accordance with the quality of service needs of the user,
service level agreements associated with the user, type of traffic between the
user and the secured network, specific access device of the user and so on.
Some routers may be capable of providing a very high capacity/bandwidth
SEG function, while other routers may be able to provide only modest
capacity to protect the secure network. It is also contemplated in some
embodiments that special-purpose routers having specific boundary device
capability, bandwidth capability and the like are deployed proximate the
secure networks of service provider customers such that rapid instantiation or
construction of secure infrastructure may be rapidly provided as discussed
herein.
In various embodiments, steps 340, 360 and/or 370 are automatically
invoked based on resource availability, such as the presence of a particular
service, the of encapsulation identifications or associations already in use, the
boundary devices or sub-devices (e.g., IPsec Modules or cards) having
excess capacity and so on. These steps may be automated via a service
aware manager (SAM) such as described herein such that specific input from
an operator is not necessary to create or provision the secure tunnels, the
mechanism by which traffic flows between the secure tunnels and the
protected network and so on.
Content provider embodiments
In one embodiment, the content provider delivers content to users via
secure IPSec paths at specific times of the day (e.g., Netflix replenishing the
client DVR devices). The IPSec infrastructure supporting the necessary IPSec
paths to supply content to users changes as the subscriber base changes.
Periodically the content provider transmits service requests to the service
creation engine (via the network management system), which requests result
in the service creation engine adapting the IPSec infrastructure to
accommodate the requested service, such as a request for additional IPSec
path to stream content to users in specific geographic area.
Television/video/Video on Demand (VOD) wholesale embodiments
FIG. 4 depicts a high-level block diagram of a system for delivering
television, video and/or VOD services to remote locations. Specifically, the
system 400 of FIG. 4 provides a mechanism wherein relatively small markets
which would otherwise not be served by the major content distribution
companies (cable companies, telecom companies and the like) may receive
such services via intermediary or wholesale companies.
Specifically, each of a plurality of cable access neighborhoods 410 are
dispersed in various geographic regions. Each of the cable access
neighborhoods 410 is associated with a respective plurality of user devices
110. Referring to FIG. 4, a first cable access neighborhood 4101 is shown as
serving a plurality of user devices 1101 , 1102 and so on through 110N. The
user devices 110 may comprise setup boxes, wireless networks or any other
user device type capable of gaining access through the equipment within the
cable access neighborhoods 410.
Each of the cable access neighborhoods 410 communicates with an
access point 420 which provides access to a network 430. In various
embodiments, the network 430 comprises a public IP network conveyed by
any type of physical layer (optical, electrical, microwave and so on).
The network 430 communicates with a security gateway (SEG) 440
including a boundary device 442. The SEG 440 communicates with a secure
network 450 within which is included expensive equipment associated with a
television, video and/or VOD service provider. For example, FIG. 4 depicts
the security Gateway 440 communicates with a head end 460 via a secured
network 150. The head end 460 includes downlink mechanisms and the like
associated with one or both of a satellite television transmission system 474 a
terrestrial television transmission system 480.
The SEG 440 operates in a manner similar to that described above
with respect to FIGS. 1-3. Within the context of the wholesale video service
architecture depicted with respect to FIG. 4, the SEG 440 is located
geographically proximate the head end 460 to reduce the expense associated
with the secured network 450.
The wholesale video architecture of FIG. 4 operates to reduce the
number of expensive equipment installations (such as cable television headends
and the like) by providing secured network communications to one or
more switches/routers (illustratively service routers) that service distant
wholesale cable-television purchasers (e.g., small metropolitan system
operators).
Specifically, the cable-television head-end receives broadcast video,
broadcast television, video programming for local storage and so on from one
or both of a terrestrial television transmitter and a satellite television
transmitter.
The head end communicates with SEG 440 via a secured network,
akin to the secure corporate network discussed above. This network includes
firewalls and various other security components. The SEG 440 is illustratively
located a short distance from the head end to reduce costs.
The SEG 440 communicates with each of a plurality (illustratively
three) of cable-television endpoints 410, such as smaller wholesalers or even
users/subscribers 110. The distance between the SEG 440, the access point
and the cable-television endpoints point may be very large, may traverse one
or more public networks and so on. Generally speaking, the specific transport
layer infrastructure adapted to provide video services between the SEG 440
and cable-television endpoints may be public/non-secured.
To preserve content security, IPSec infrastructure is configured to
provide one or more secure IPSec paths or sessions to support the cabletelevision
endpoints. The provisioning and monitoring of the secure IPSec
path is performed by network management software/hardware such as
described above.
Single Form provisioning embodiments
In various embodiments, the service provider provisions services for
customers via operators interacting with one or more windows within a
graphical user interface at a user terminal at, illustratively, a Network
Operations Center (NOC). To efficiently provide such services, one
embodiment contemplates a single form entry in which only a minimum
amount of data associated with a secure network to be protected (i.e.,
identification of the secure network) is provided. Another embodiment
contemplates an automatic provisioning of such services in response to a
customer request in which the secure network to be protected is provided.
Thus, the various embodiments provide an ability to configure an IPSec
system using a single configuration form, rather than multiple configuration
forms associated with each of the multiple steps necessary to configure such
a system. In this manner, the usual time-consuming interaction of network
operations personnel is avoided, where each interaction is normally
associated with a particular form for data entry (e.g., forms to select and
provision the network equipment, links and so on, forms to provide groupings
for redundancy function, forms to provide secure services, forms to configure
encryption keys policies and so on).
In one embodiment, a NOC user invokes a method according to
various embodiments at, illustratively, a computer terminal supporting a
graphical user interface in which a secure IPSec establishment form is
provided. This form accepts as input various criteria associated with a desired
secure IPSec functionality.
First, a selection is made as to the network to be secured (e.g., a
corporate network, intranet, Internet, single or multiple leased portions of a
network and so on).
Second, a selection is made as to the specific entry or access point(s)
to the selected network that will be used to support the desired secure IPSec
functionality. These entry points may comprise, illustratively, a bridge (e.g., a
router) between the network to be secured (e.g., the secure or corporate
network of FIG. 1) and an access or core network (e.g., the non-secure or
service provider network of FIG. 1) . Alternatively, default access points may
be used.
A corporation that wishes to use its secure corporate network within the
context of remote workers may provide a service request including an access
point for each worker or, more likely, an access point for each of N workers,
where N is an integer greater than one but less than the total number of
workers. There is generally no need to provide one access point for each
remote user, unless it is necessary for all users to access the remote network
at the same time.
The physical locations of the various access points are adapted to the
likely location of the remote users. There is no benefit to allocating all access
points to one physical location where remote users will be dispersed
throughout a broad geographic region. In this case, those remote users in a
geographically distant region will be forced to use one or more access
networks just to get to the access point, which will certainly reduce the quality
of experience and possibly increase the cost of their access of the secure
company network via the secure IPSec infrastructure overlaid upon the non
secure public network. The secure IPSec tunnel supporting the worker will run
through whatever networks are necessary to connect the worker to the
boundary card.
Third, a selection is made as to the type of IPSec provisioning to be
used, such as the public or private access points or access point types that
will be capable of communicating with the bridging mechanism, as well as the
protocols and so on supporting such communications. Alternatively, a default
IPSec provisioning may be used.
The network selected for protection, as well as any access point, IPSec
provisioning information or other information is then processed by a service
creation engine to generate an IPSec infrastructure. The generated IPSec
infrastructure may be optimized, validated in whole or in part, or otherwise
refined before implementation.
Service Creation Engine (SCE) embodiments
One embodiment comprises a service creation engine (SCE) that
creates an entire IPSec infrastructure/service layer in response to a service
request including various profile information (e.g., selected secured network,
network entry points and type the IPSec provisioning). The service creation
engine examines the available cross-connects (public/private), configured for
use in various IPSec tunnels or dynamic VPN tunnels adapted for the
application, invokes the various provisioning algorithms and so on.
The service creation engine determines which services are to be
secured and which nodes are needed to provide the desired access to the
client or company. The IPSec infrastructure/service layer created by the
service creation engine is optionally provided to a service provider for
analysis, such as when one or more portions of the created IPSec layer
traverse network equipment controlled by the service provider. The service
provider analyzes the output of the service creation engine to identify the
equipment necessary to satisfy the created IPSec infrastructure/service layer;
such as requests to add, scale or otherwise update the requisite equipment,
algorithms for encryption and key exchange, encryption keys and the like.
A tunnel template may include various signaling parameters that are
employed to enable encryption/decryption of transport packets. Moreover,
various rules/policies are employed to manage traffic flows, such as assigning
IP addresses within a particular range to corresponding particular services,
thereby mapping those IP addresses to particular services. Moreover,
fractional use of IPSec tunnels may be employed to manage capacity
reserved for the various services, such as bandwidth or switching capacity
within a Service Gateway (SEG).
In various embodiments, customers provide service requests to the
network provider including the various profile information associated with the
secured service to be set up. The profile information is substantially as
described above, and may include the identity of a corporate server to secure,
the access points to be used with respect to secured service, the protocols to
be used the encryption keys to use and so on.
In response, the service creation engine processes the service
requests to automatically generate a secured IPSec infrastructure for use in
satisfying the service request. Origins of the generated secured IPSec
infrastructure may require further analysis by intermediate service providers to
ensure that the assumptions associated with the generated infrastructure are
appropriate. If they are not, service providers respond with suggestions
(hopefully) or least an indication of which portions of the generated secured
IPSec infrastructure are not workable.
In various embodiments, the SCE receives parameters (e.g., a profile)
regarding desired IPSec services and responsiveiy implements provisioning of
the underlying communications channels (transport layer) and the layering of
the appropriate IPSec infrastructure on the provision transport layer. This
embodiment provides an automated or semi automated system in which a
customer can provide a service request defining a network the customer
wishes to provide access to (e.g., a secure corporate network or intranet) and
the various parameters associated with that access, such as the number of
remote users, the specific access points for users to access a network and so
on. The SCE may be used in an autonomous mode to provide a provisioning
plan in response to the received parameters.
The SCE may be used in an interactive mode within, e.g., a Network
Operations Center user via a single-form entry screen (versus the multiple
screens/forms presently used). The network manager software may interact
with management software associated with intermediate network clouds to
determine whether or not the IPSec infrastructure assumptions are
appropriate for various parameters, such as other (e.g., third party owned)
network clouds. Other permutations are also contemplated. Various
embodiments comprise the SCE itself, the software utilized by the NOC user,
methodologies including the interaction between the SEC, user, profile and/or
third-party management software associated with other network clouds.
IPSec infrastructure monitoring embodiments
After the creation/provisioning of a secure IPSec infrastructure, another
embodiment of the method enters a proactive monitoring mode of operation.
In this embodiment, the various network elements and links associated with
each path are known, such as within the context of the various
communications or management systems (e.g., the Service Aware Manager
Lucent (SAM) manufactured by Alcatel-Lucent for managing LTE systems).
Various of the management functions discussed herein may be used
within the context of the embodiments to correlate the transport layer
elements associated with each path and/or IPSec tunnel such that improved
network management capabilities may be provided. In this manner, the
degradation of service associated with a particular secured IPSec
infrastructure path may be used to identify which of the network elements or
links necessary to that path has it degraded. Similarly, the degradation of
service associated with a particular network element or link may be used to
identify which of the secured IPSec infrastructure paths correlated with the
bad degraded network element or link might experience a problem.
In response to a failure (such as at an access point, link or network
element), the encapsulating entity automatically correlates the failure to the
secure IPSec path and/or one or more of the transmission layer elements
supporting that path. The encapsulating entity and management function, a
switch or router including the boundary card, a service aware manager (SAM)
and the like. Further, an impact analysis is performed to determine which
other secure IPSec path and/or transmission layer elements have failed or
have been degraded.
Optionally, network probes or test vectors are executed to identify
specific secure IPSec paths, mobile services, network elements, links and the
like which may be degraded or failing. These tests measure network
performance in real-time and elevate error conditions or other indications of
network degradation before such degradation results in a larger problem or
failure.
In various embodiments, the provisioned IPSec infrastructure is
monitored to determine if any error conditions or other anomalies are detected
indicative of potential service degradation or failure. This monitoring may be of
a passive nature, in which error conditions, alarm conditions and the like are
transmitted to the network management systems as they occur, in which an
electric management system takes appropriate corrective action. This
monitoring may be of an active nature, in which test vectors and/or other
auditing mechanisms are utilized to test or exercise transport layer elements
in an attempt to identify impending error conditions. For example, test vectors
causing an increased bandwidth utilization may be used to stress the various
components supporting one or more secure IPSec paths to determine
whether or not an increase in bandwidth utilization will result in the
degradation of service.
FIG. 5 depicts an exemplary management system suitable for use in
the various embodiments. As depicted in FIG. 5, MS 500 includes a
processor 510, a memory 520, a network interface 530N, and a user interface
5301. The processor 510 is coupled to each of the memory 520, the network
interface 530N, and the user interface 530I.
The processor 510 is adapted to cooperate with the memory 520, the
network interface 530N, the user interface 530I, and the support circuits 540
to provide various management functions for a network 130, such as the un
secured networks 130 discussed above with respect to the various figures.
The memory 520, generally speaking, stores data and tools that are
adapted for use in providing various management functions for Network 130.
The memory includes a Discovery Engine (DE) 521 , a Discovery Database
(DD) 522, a Correlation Engine (CE) 523, a Paths Database (PD) 524, an
Analyzer Tool (ANT) 525, an Audit Tool (AUT) 526, a Trace Tool (TT) 527, a
service creation engine (SCE) 528 and a service database (SD) 529.
Optionally, a Fairness Management Tool (FMT) method be provided (not
shown).
In one embodiment, the DE 521 , CE 523, ANT 525, AUT 526, TT 527,
SCE 528 and SD 529 are implemented using software instructions which may
be executed by processor (e.g., processor 510) for performing the various
management functions depicted and described herein.
The Discovery Database (DD) 522 and Paths Database (PD) 524 each
store data which may be generated by and used by various ones and/or
combinations of the engines and tools of memory 520. The DD 522 and PD
524 may be combined into a single database or may be implemented as
respective databases. Either of the combined or respective databases may
be implemented as single databases or multiple databases in any of the
arrangements known to those skilled in the art.
Although depicted and described with respect to an embodiment in
which each of the engines, databases, and tools is stored within memory 120,
it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the engines, databases,
and/or tools may be stored in one or more other storage devices internal to
MS 500 and/or external to MS 500. The engines, databases, and/or tools
may be distributed across any suitable numbers and/or types of storage
devices internal and/or external to MS 500. The memory 520, including each
of the engines, databases, and tools of memory 520, is described in additional
detail herein.
The network interface 530N is adapted to facilitate communications
with network 130. For example, network interface 530N is adapted to receive
information from network 130 (e.g., discovery information adapted for use in
determining the topology of the network, results of test initiated by MS 500 to
network 130, and the like, as well as any other information which may be
received by MS 500 from network 130 in support of the management
functions performed by MS 500). Similarly, for example, network interface
530N is adapted to transmit information to network 130 (e.g., discovery
requests for discovering information adapted for use by MS 500 in
determining the topology of network, audit requests for auditing portions of
Network 130, and the like, as well as any other information which may be
transmitted by MS 500 to Network 130 in support of the management
functions performed by MS 500).
The user interface 530I is adapted to facilitate communications with
one or more user workstations (illustratively, user workstation 550), for
enabling one or more users to perform management functions for Network
130. The communications include communications to user workstation 550
(e.g., for presenting imagery generated by MS 500) and communications from
user workstation 550 (e.g., for receiving user interactions with information
presented via user workstation 550). Although primarily depicted and
described as a direct connection between MS 500 and user workstation 550,
it will be appreciated that the connection between MS 500 and user
workstation 550 may be provided using any suitable underlying
communication capabilities, such that user workstation 550 may be located
proximate to MS 500 (e.g., such as where both MS 500 and user workstation
550 are located within a Network Operations Center (NOC)) or remote from
MS 500 (e.g., such as where communications between MS 500 and user
workstation 550 may be transported over long distances).
Although primarily depicted and described herein with respect to one
user workstation, it will be appreciated that MS 500 may communicate with
any suitable number of user workstations, such that any number of users may
perform management functions for Network 130 (e.g., such as where a team
of technicians at a NOC access MS 500 via respective user workstations for
performing various management functions for Network 130). Although
primarily depicted and described with respect to user workstations, it will be
appreciated that user interface 530I may be adapted to support
communications with any other devices suitable for use in managing Network
130 via MS 500 (e.g., for displaying imagery generated by MS 500 on one or
more common NOC display screens, for enabling remote Virtual Private
Network (VPN) access to MS 500 by users via remote computers, and the
like, as well as various combinations thereof). The use of user workstations to
perform management functions via interaction with a management system will
be understood by one skilled in the art.
As described herein, memory 520 includes a Discovery Engine (DE)
521 , a Discovery Database (DD) 522, a Correlation Engine (CE) 523, a Paths
Database (PD) 524, an Analyzer Tool (ANT) 525, an Audit Tool (AUT) 526, a
Trace Tool (TT) 527, a service creation engine (SCE) 528, a service database
(SP) 529 and, optionally, a Fairness Management Tool (FMT) method (not
shown). DE 521 , DD 522, CE 523, PD 524, ANT 525, AUT 526, TT 527, and
FMT 528, which cooperate to provide the various management functions
depicted and described herein. Although primarily depicted and described
herein with respect to specific functions being performed by and/or using
specific ones of the engines, databases, and/or tools of memory 520, it will be
appreciated that any of the management functions depicted and described
herein may be performed by and/or using any one or more of the engines,
databases, and/or tools of memory 520.
The engines and tools may be activated in any suitable manner. In one
embodiment, for example, the engines and tools may be activated in
response to manual requests initiated by users via user workstations, in
response to automated requests initiated by MS 500, and the like, as well as
various combinations thereof.
For example, where an engine or tool is activated automatically, the
engine or tool may be activated in response to scheduled requests, in
response to requests initiated by MS 500 based on processing performed at
MS 500 (e.g., such as where results generated by CE 523 indicate that ANT
525 should be invoked, such as where results of an audit performed by ANT
525 indicate that the TT 527 should be invoked, such as where results of a
mobile session path trace performed by TT indicate that FMT 528 should be
invoked, and the like, as well as combinations thereof). A description of the
engines, databases, and tools of MS 500 follows.
In one embodiment, where an automatically triggered engine or tool
begins to consume computing or other resources above a threshold level,
subsequent automatic triggering of the engine or tool is constrained. In this
embodiment, an alarm or status indicator is provided to the network manager
indicative of the constrained automatic triggering condition such that the
network manager or operating personnel may assume direct or manual
control of the engine or tool.
Generic Network Embodiments
The above-described embodiments operate to configure elements
within an existing non-secure network environment to enable the services
necessary to support secure tunneling between access points for users
accessing a secure network via a non-secure network, such as Level 3 (L3)
Virtual Private Networking (VPN) services, VPRN, IES and/or other services.
When configured, the secure network (e.g., a corporate network) is protected
with respect to users accessing the corporate network through non-secure
networks such as the Internet (e.g., IPSec connections to corporate or other
secure networks).
In a Secure Gateway (SEG) embodiment, a router associated with a
boundary device operates as a secure client to a secure network, while
various users operate as secure clients to the router. In this manner, IPSec
traffic associated with the users is terminated at the boundary device of the
Secure Gateway rather than at a termination point associated with the secure
network. By avoiding the termination of multiple user IPSec tunnels within the
secure network, the security of the network is enhanced, the provisioning
complexity is reduced, and the corporate network may retain existing services
and protocols (e.g., L2 VPN).
The various embodiments are operable within any of a plurality of
network environments. Generally speaking, the various embodiments provide
systems, apparatus, methodologies, functions, programs, topologies and so
supporting a mechanism in which transport layer elements within a non
secure network are discovered, configured and correlated with paths
supported by those transport layer elements such that various management
functions including subsequent discovery and configuration functions may be
more efficiently implemented.
Detailed Examples Using an LTE Network Embodiment
Various embodiments will now be described within the context of an
LTE network. In particular, the various management functions will be
described in more detail with respect to LTE-related network environments,
including network analysis functions, fault analysis functions, audit functions,
tracing functions, fairness or bandwidth management functions and so on. It
will be appreciated by those skilled in the art and informed by the present
teachings that the systems, apparatus, methodologies, functions, programs,
topologies and so on described herein with respect to LTE-related network
environments are also applicable to other network environments, such as the
various networks described above as well as other types of networks,
systems, topologies and so on.
Correlation of Paths and Transport Layer Elements using LTE Example
Various embodiments utilize a known correlation between transport
layer elements and the IPSec paths they support. Any of the various
embodiments described herein with respect to IPSec may be combined in any
manner with each other and with any of the various embodiments described
below, such as providing IPSec related management functions, tools,
methods, apparatus, systems data structures and so on in accordance with
the descriptions herein.
A management capability is provided for managing a Fourth
Generation (4G) Long Term Evolution (LTE) wireless network. The
management capability may include one or more of an analyzer tool, an audit
tool, a trace tool, an enforcement tool, and the like, as well as combinations
thereof. Although primarily depicted and described herein within the context
of providing management functions within a 4G LTE wireless network, it will
be appreciated that the management functions depicted and described herein
may be utilized within other types of wireless networks.
FIG. 6 depicts an exemplary wireless communication system including
a management system according to an embodiment. Specifically, FIG. 6
depicts an exemplary wireless communication system 600 that includes a
plurality of User Equipments (UEs) or User Devices (UDs) 602, a Long Term
Evolution (LTE) network 610, IP networks 630, and a management system
(MS) 640. The LTE network 610 supports communications between the UEs
602 and IP networks 630. The MS 640 is configured for supporting various
management functions for LTE network 610 such as described with respect to
the MS 500 of FIG. 5 and further as described herein.
The UEs 602 are wireless user devices capable of accessing a
wireless network, such as LTE network 610. The UEs 602 are capable of
supporting control signaling in support of the bearer session(s). The UEs 602
may be a phone, PDA, computer, or any other wireless user device.
The LTE network 610 is an exemplary LTE network. The configuration
and operation of LTE networks will be understood by one skilled in the art.
The exemplary LTE network 6 10 includes two eNodeBs 6 11 and 6 112
(collectively, eNodeBs 6 11), two Serving Gateways (SGWs) 612 and 6122
(collectively, SGWs 612), a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (PGW) 613,
two Mobility Management Entities (MMEs) 614 and 6142 (collectively, MMEs
614), and a Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) 6 15. The eNodeBs
6 11 provide a radio access interface for UEs 602. The SGWs 612, PGW 613,
MMEs 614, and PCRF 615, as well as other components which have been
omitted for purposes of clarity, cooperate to provide an Evolved Packet Core
(EPC) network supporting end-to-end service delivery using IP.
The eNodeBs 6 11 support communications for UEs 602. As depicted in
FIG. 6, each eNodeB 6 11 supports a respective plurality of UEs 602. The
communication between the eNodeBs 6 11 and the UEs 602 is supported
using LTE-Uu interfaces associated with each of the UEs 602.
The SGWs 612 support communications for eNodeBs 6 11. As depicted
in FIG. 6, SGW 6 12 supports communications for eNodeB 6 11 and SGW
6 122 supports communications for eNodeB 6 112. The communication
between the SGWs 612 and the eNodeBs 6 11 is supported using respective
S1-u interfaces. The S1-u interfaces support per-bearer user plane tunneling
and inter-eNodeB path switching during handover.
The PGW 613 supports communications for the SGWs 612. The
communication between PGW 613 and SGWs 612 is supported using
respective S5/S8 interfaces. The S5 interfaces provide functions such as user
plane tunneling and tunnel management for communications between PGW
613 and SGWs 612, SGW relocation due to UE mobility, and the like. The S8
interfaces, which are Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) variants of the S5
interfaces, provide inter-PLMN interfaces providing user and control plane
connectivity between the SGW in the Visitor PLMN (VPLMN) and the PGW in
the Home PLMN (HPLMN). The PGW 613 facilitates communications
between LTE network 610 and IP networks 630 via an SGi interface.
The MMEs 614 provide mobility management functions in support of
mobility of UEs 602. The MMEs 614 support the eNodeBs 6 11. The MME
614i supports eNodeB 6 11 and the MME 6142 supports eNodeB 6 112. The
communication between MMEs 614 and eNodeBs 6 11 is supported using
respective S1-MME interfaces, which provide control plane protocols for
communication between the MMEs 614 and the eNodeBs 6 11.
The PCRF 615 provides dynamic management capabilities by which
the service provider may manage rules related to services provided via LTE
network 610 and rules related to charging for services provided via LTE
network 610.
As depicted in FIG. 6, elements of LTE network 610 communicate via
interfaces between the elements. The interfaces described with respect to
LTE network 610 also may be referred to as sessions.
The LTE network 610 includes an Evolved Packet System/Solution
(EPS). In one embodiment, the EPS includes EPS nodes (e.g., eNodeBs
6 11, SGWs 612, PGW 613, MMEs 614, and PCRF 615) and EPS-related
interconnectivity (e.g., the S* interfaces, the G* interfaces, and the like). The
EPS-related interfaces may be referred to herein as EPS-related paths.
The IP networks 630 include one or more packet data networks via
which UEs 602 may access content, services, and the like.
The MS 640 provides management functions for managing the LTE
network 610. The MS 640 may communicate with LTE network 610 in any
suitable manner. In one embodiment, for example, MS 640 may communicate
with LTE network 610 via a communication path 641 which does not traverse
IP networks 630. In one embodiment, for example, MS 640 may
communicate with LTE network 610 via a communication path 642 which is
supported by IP networks 630. The communication paths 641 and 642 may
be implemented using any suitable communications capabilities. An
exemplary management system suitable for use as MS 640 of FIG. 6 is
depicted and described with respect to FIG. 5.
FIG. 6 further depicts a path associated with an exemplary Mobile
Service 601 . As depicted in FIG. 6, the exemplary Mobile Service 601
includes eNodeB 1111, SGW 1121 , PGW 113, the S 1-u interface between
eNodeB 1111 and SGW 1121 , the S5/S8 interface between SGW 1121 and
PGW 113, the SGi interface between PGW 113 and IP networks 130, the S1-
MME interface between eNodeB 1111 and MME 1141 , the S1-u interface
between SGW 1121 and MME 1141 , and the S7 interface between PGW 113
and PCRF 115. The exemplary Mobile Service 601 is marked on FIG. 6 using
a solid line representation. Optional embodiments may include MME 1141
and PCRF 115, for example.
EPS-Path-IPSec Infrastructure Correlation
As previously noted with respect to FIG. 6, various embodiments of an
LTE network 1 0 include an Evolved Packet System/Solution (EPS)
infrastructure having EPS nodes (e.g., eNodeBs 111, SGWs 112, PGW 113,
MMEs 114, and PCRF 115) and EPS-related interconnectivity (e.g., S*
interfaces, the G* interfaces, and the like). Within the context of this present
disclosure, the EPS-related interfaces are referred to herein as EPS-related
paths or simply paths.
The infrastructure is architected to provide the appropriate and
necessary EPS nodes for supporting the wireless services offered by the
network service provider. The network service provider manages the network
to provide its service offerings to its wireless/mobile users in a manner
consistent with the consumer expectations. For example, wireless/mobile
users (e.g., users of standard telephones, smart phones, computers and the
like purchasing various voice, data or other service offerings) expect near
perfect telephone/voice service, very near perfect data services, glitch-free
streaming media and the like. Third party service providers purchasing
service bundles for their own users expect the same, as well as management
level interfaces and other mechanisms to provide interoperability between the
various networks. Customer expectations may comprise an assumed or
expected level of service, a level of service defined in a service level
agreement (SLA) and the like.
Various embodiments are directed to network management systems
and tools wherein each EPS-related interconnection is correlated to the
specific infrastructure necessary to support that functionality. That is, for each
EPS-related path, an association is made to the specific infrastructure
necessary to support that path, including the network elements, sub-elements,
links and so on which, if they fail or degrade, will result in failure or
degradation of the associated EPS-related path.
By understanding which traffic flows or paths include an element, sub
element or link as a necessary support element, the network management
system can then know which traffic flows or paths are impacted by the
degradation/failure of a specific element, sub element or link. Moreover, the
network management system can then know which IPSec tunnels are
impacted by the degradation/failure of specific traffic flows or paths. This is
especially useful in the context of an analysis tool, as will be discussed in
more detail elsewhere.
Similarly, by understanding which IPSec tunnel or traffic flow or path
has failed or degraded, the network management system can then identify
which elements, sub elements or links are necessary to support the IPSec
tunnel or traffic flow or path. In this manner, the network manager reduces
the complexity of identifying the element(s), sub-element(s) and/or link(s) that
failed/degraded element or sub element associated with the IPSec tunnel or
traffic flow or path that failed or degraded. This is especially useful in the
context of a trace tool, as discussed in more detail herein.
Within the context of correlation, the management system may create a
service representation for each connection between a network element or
sub-element.
In various embodiments, a connection is provided between ports at
either or both of the physical level (e.g., a cable or other physical level link) or
the service level (e.g., a generalized cloud or other service level link).
In one physical level connection embodiment, if a port (or other subelement)
on a first network element (NE) fails, then a corresponding or
connected port (or other sub-element) on a second NE will show a link down
status (LLDP). In this manner, the second NE is aware of the failure of the
first NE. In other physical level connection embodiment, such awareness is
provided within the context of neighboring network elements, such as routers
or switches and/or their various sub-elements.
In one service level embodiment, a port (or other sub-element) on a
first NE may be connected directly to a port (or other sub-element) on a
second NE, or through one or more ports (or other sub-elements) of one or
more NEs (i.e., multiple hops between the first and second NEs). In this
embodiment, if the port (or other sub-element) on the first or any intermediate
NE fails or degrades, the management system may not be aware that the
failure/degradation exists due to the operational status of the last NE in the
sequence of NEs. However, due to the management techniques and tool
discussed herein, the network manager is made aware of the initial or
intermediate failure/degradation. Various causes of this behavior include
congestion, local/regional rerouting and the like. In brief, status indicators are
green (indicative of appropriate operation), but the performance of this portion
of the network is constrained or degraded. This constrained or degraded
network operation is correlated and illustrated by the various embodiments
discussed herein.
Discovery Tool/Function
The discovery engine (DE) 521 is generally adapted for providing
network discovery functions for discovering information about LTE network
110. Generally speaking, the DE 521 performs a discovery process in which
configuration information, status/operating information and connection
information regarding the elements and sub-elements forming the network is
gathered, retrieved, inferred and/or generated as will be discussed in more
detail below.
The discovery process may be dynamic in that the underlying
elements, sub-elements and links within the LTE network may change over
time due to local network adaptations, rerouting, failures, degradations,
scheduled maintenance and the like. Thus, the DE 521 may be invoked after
a network change is detected or caused by any of the ANT 525, AUT 526, TT
527, and FMT 528.
At a first discovery level, the network management system (NMS) uses
any legacy database information to discover the various elements (and the
corresponding sub-elements) forming the network to be managed. That is,
some of this discovery comprises the use of existing database information
which provides a general blueprint of the network to be managed. Information
in such a database includes information associated with the major functional
elements forming a network, the major pipes or conduits established within
the network and so on. While such information may be extremely detailed,
the information does not reflect path-level network operation.
At a second discovery level, the network management system requests
configuration information, status/operating information and connection
information from each of the network elements within the managed network.
The requested information includes information useful in determining the
specific switches, ports, buffers, protocols and the like within the network
elements that support the various traffic flows.
The network management system may also utilize the existing
database information to infer possible connections between network elements
and sub-elements and connections within the network being managed. For
example, the existing database information may be constructed as depicting a
sequence of connected network elements that may support traffic flows
between them. However, the existing database information likely does not
include information identifying the specific switches, ports, buffers, protocols,
address information of received/transmitted packets and the like within the
network elements that support the various traffic flows.
Configuration information comprises information identifying a network
element, the function and/or configuration of the network element, the function
and/or configuration of the sub-elements forming a network element and so
on. Configuration information illustratively includes, but is not limited to,
information identifying the type of network element, protocols supported by
the network element, services supported by the network element and so on.
Configuration information illustratively includes information attending to the
various sub-elements within the network element, such as the input ports,
switches, buffers, and output ports and so on associated with the subelements
forming a network element.
Status/operating information comprises status/operating information
associated with the operating state of the network element and/or the subelements
forming a network element. Status/operating information
illustratively includes, but is not limited to, information providing operating
status/alarm indicators, including information pertaining to metrics such as
packet count, utilization level, component pass/fail indication, bit error rate
(BER) and the like.
Connection information comprises information useful in ascertaining or
inferring the connections between network elements and/or sub-elements,
such as the source of data received from the network element or its subelements,
the destination of data transmitted by the network element or its
sub-elements and so on. That is, connection information is information
provided by a network element from the subjective perspective of the network
element. The network element does not necessarily have information
specifically identifying the network elements from which it receives packets or
the network element toward which it transmits packets.
Connection information illustratively includes, but is not limited to,
source address information associated with received packets, destination
address information associated with transmitted packets, protocol information
associated with packet flows, service information associated with packet
flows, deep packet inspection results data and the like.
At a third discovery level, the network management system uses the
discovered information to form a detailed framework representing each of the
elements, sub-elements and links forming the infrastructure of the network, as
well as their respective and various interconnections.
Generally speaking, the DE 521 may discover any suitable information
associated with LTE network 110, which may be referred to collectively herein
as discovery information, and further divided into configuration information,
status/operating information and connection information.
In various embodiments, DE 521 discovers components of the LTE
network 110 and information associated with components of the LTE network
110., such network elements (EPC network elements, non-EPC network
elements, and the like), sub-elements of network elements (e.g., chassis,
traffic cards, control cards, interfaces, ports, processors, memory, and the
like), communication links connecting network elements, interfaces/sessions
that support communications between network elements (e.g., LTE-Uu
sessions, S* sessions, and the like), reference points, functions, services, and
the like, as well as combinations thereof.
DE 521 may discover the network elements of LTE network 110 (e.g.,
EPC network elements such as the eNodeBs 111, SGWs 112, PGW 113,
MMEs 14, PCRF 115, and the like; non-EPC network elements that facilitate
communication via sessions between the EPC network elements; and the like,
as well as combinations thereof). DE 521 may discover network element
configuration information associated with network elements of LTE network
110 (e.g., chassis configurations, line cards, ports on the line cards,
processors, memory, and the like, which may depend on the types of network
elements for which discovery is performed). DE 521 may discover
interface/session information (e.g., information associated with LTE-Uu
sessions, information associated with S* sessions, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof). DE 521 may discover reference points of LTE network
110. DE 521 may discover functions, services, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof. DE 521 may discover any other information that is
associated with LTE network 110 and which is or may be suitable for use in
providing the various management functions depicted and described herein.
The DE 521 may discover the information associated with LTE network
110 in any suitable manner (e.g., from any suitable sources, at any suitable
times, using any suitable protocols, in any suitable formats, and the like, as
well as combinations thereof).
The discovered information is stored in one or more databases to
facilitate rapid retrieval by network operations personnel and/or other users,
such as the Discovery Database (DD) 522. The DD 522 may store the
discovery information in any suitable format, as will be understood by one
skilled it the art. The DD 522 provides a repository of discovery information
for use by CE 523 and, optionally, for use by one or more of ANT 525, AUT
526, TT 527, and FMT 528 for providing their respective management
functions.
Correlation Engine Tool/Function
The Correlation Engine (CE) 523 provides correlation of information
used to support the management functions depicted and described herein.
The CE 523 utilizes configuration information, status/operations information
and/or connections information, illustratively provided by the DE 521 and
stored within the DD 522, to correlate discovered network element, subelement
and link functions to specific customer traffic flows and/or paths
supporting customer services. That is, using the framework representing
each of the elements, sub-elements and links within the network and their
various interconnections, the CE 523 correlates each customer service, traffic
flow and/or EPS-path to the specific elements, sub-elements and links
necessary to support the customer service, traffic flow and/or path.
The correlation process may be dynamic in that, for any given path, the
underlying elements, sub-elements and links supporting that path may change
over time due to local network adaptations, rerouting, failures, degradations,
scheduled maintenance and the like. Thus, CE 523 may be invoked after a
network change is detected or caused by any of the ANT 525, AUT 526, TT
527, and FMT 528.
The CE 533 operates to maintain a current representation of the
necessary supporting infrastructure associated with each customer service,
traffic flow and/or path. By providing this representation, efforts responsive to
customer service failure or degradation can be focused on the specific
element, sub-element and link functions supporting the impacted customer
service (e.g., by using Trace Tool (TT) 527). Similarly, efforts responsive to
element, sub-element and link function failure or degradation can be focused
on the specific customers and/or services supported by the impacted element,
sub-element and link function.
Typically, only a small subset of the sub-elements within a particular
element is necessary to support a particular path. Thus, a failure associated
with other sub-elements within an element does not impact that particular
path. By correlating to each path only those elements necessary to support
the path, the processing/storage burdens associated with managing individual
paths are reduced by avoiding processing/storage requirements associated
with nonessential (from the perspective of a particular path) elements.
In one embodiment, CE 523 may process discovery information stored
in Discovery Database (DD) 522 for purposes of determining the underlying
transport elements supporting the paths of LTE network 110, which is then
stored in Paths Database (PD) 524. In one embodiment, the path correlated
transport element information determined by CE 523 and stored in PD 524
includes EPS-related paths of LTE network 10. In general, an EPS-related
path is a path that is a transport mechanism that represents a peering
relationship between two EPS reference points, where an EPS reference
point is a termination point for any node of LTE network 110 that implements
one or more of the protocols present in the 4G specification (e.g., using GTP,
PMIP, or any other suitable protocols, and the like, as well as combinations
thereof). The path correlated transport element information may comprise
network elements, communications links, subnets, protocols, services,
applications, layers and any portions thereof. These transport elements may
be managed by the network management system or portions thereof. The
network management system may simply be aware of these transport
elements.
In one embodiment, the path correlated transport element information
determined by CE 523 and stored in PD 524 includes other types of paths
(e.g., paths other than EPS-related paths). For example, the other types of
paths may include one or more of: ( 1) paths that form sub-portions of EPSrelated
paths (e.g., where an EPS-related path is supported using underlying
communications technology, the path that forms a sub-portion of the EPSrelated
path may be a path associated with the underlying communications
technology, (2) paths that include multiple EPS-related paths (e.g., paths from
eNodeBs to PGWs that traverse both S1-u and S5/S8 sessions, paths from
UEs to SGWs that traverse both LTE-Uu sessions and S1-u sessions, and the
like), and (3) end-to-end mobile session paths (e.g., paths between UEs and
IP networks). The path correlated transport element information determined
by CE 523 and stored in PD 524 may include other information correlated with
various types of paths.
The path correlated transport element information determined by the
CE 523 and stored in the PD 524 may be determined using any suitable
processing.
The CE 523 is adapted for making direct correlations between
discovered components of LTE network 1 0 .
The CE 523 is adapted for making inferences regarding associations
between discovered components of LTE network 110.
In one embodiment, the network manager within which the CE 523 is
operative includes substantially all of the information related to the peering of
different EPS Paths (including S1-u). From that peering information, the CE
523 may identify nodes on each end of a path and then identify or examine
the corresponding neighbor nodes. From the neighbor node information, the
CE 523 may then identify or examine a next group of neighbor nodes and so
on.
The correlation engine begins processing a path upon discovering that
path from a managed network element. The correlation engine calculates,
infers and/or otherwise discovers the various infrastructure elements, subelements
and links supporting that path upon discovery of the path. In one
embodiment, an initial S1-u reference point in the SGW is discovered. When
any reference points or S-peer is discovered, a corresponding S- path is
then formed.
The paths determined by the CE 523 may have any suitable path
information associated therewith. In one embodiment, for example, path
information associated with an EPS-related path may include any information
indicative of the underlying communications capabilities supporting the EPSrelated
path. For example, the path information for an EPS-related path may
include information identifying S* reference points forming the endpoints of
the EPS-related path, identifying network elements supporting the path (e.g.,
routers, switches, and the like), identifying ports on the network elements that
support the path, identifying IP interfaces supporting the path, specifying
configurations of the IP interfaces supporting the path, specifying the
configurations of the ports of network elements that support the path (e.g.,
administrative configurations, operational configurations, and the like), and the
like, as well as combinations thereof.
In various embodiments, paths are grouped together in a logical
structure according to a common element, sub-element, link, service,
provider, third party service lessee and so on.
A bundle may be a logical grouping of paths that share a common
element, such as a common end point element, start point element and the
like. In this context, bundling is useful to identifying all of the paths that will be
impacted by the failure of the common element. That is, a number of paths
terminated at a particular network element from a plurality of other network
elements of a common type may be defined as a bundle or group. Examples
include "all of the eNodeB elements in communication with SGWx" where
SGWx represents a specific SGW); or "all of the SGWs communicating with a
PGWx" (where PGWx represents a specific PGW). These and other bundles
or groups may be defined to enable rapid identification of network elements or
sub-elements that are similarly situated in terms of a common network
element or sub element to which they are connected.
The correlated information is stored in one or more databases to
facilitate rapid retrieval by network operations personnel and/or other users,
such as the Path Database (PD) 524.The PD 524 stores path correlated
transport element information determined by CE 523. The PD 524 may store
the path correlated transport element information and associated path
information in any suitable format. The PD 524 provides a repository of path
and network element related information for use by one or more of ANT 525,
AUT 526, TT 527, and FMT 528 for providing their respective management
functions.
FIG. 7 depicts a high-level block diagram illustrating a discovery and
correlation process performed by a management system according to one
embodiment. As depicted in FIG. 7, and described herein with respect to the
various figures, the discovery and correlation process 700 performed by
exemplary MS 140 is performed by DE 521 , DD 522, CE 523, and PD 524.
The DE 521 discovers information associated with LTE network 10 and
stores discovery information in DD 522, DE 521 and DD 522 provide
discovery information to CE 523 for use by CE 523 in correlating the
discovery information for identifying paths of the LTE network and storing the
path correlated transport element information associated with the identified
paths of the LTE network in the PD 524.
FIG. 8 depicts a high-level block diagram illustrating a discovery and
correlation process performed by the exemplary management system suitable
for use in various embodiments. As depicted in FIG. 8, and described with
respect to the various figures, the service creation and correlation process
800 performed by exemplary MS 140 is performed by service creation engine
528, correlation engine 523, paths database 524 and service database 529.
The service creation engine 528 generates a service layer such as an
IPSec service layer built upon various paths supported by the transport layer
infrastructure of LTE network 110 and stores the service layer information in
service database 529. The service creation engine 528 may also modify,
update, validate or otherwise change the service layer, in which case the
service layer information in service database 529 is also changed.
The service creation engine 528 and service database 529 provide
service information to CE 523 for use by CE 523 in correlating the services to
previously identified paths (and supporting transport layer elements) of the
LTE network 110 and storing the service correlated path and, by extension,
the transport element information associated with service correlated paths the
LTE network 110 in the PD 524. The discovery and correlation process 800 of
FIG. 8 may be better understood by way of reference to FIGS. 1-5 and the
corresponding text.
The Analyzer Tool (ANT) 525 structures EPS elements of an LTE
network into Mobile Services. In one embodiment, the EPS elements include
the EPS network elements (e.g., eNodeBs, SGWs, PGWs, MMEs, the PCRF,
and/or any other EPS-related network elements) and the EPS-related
interconnectivity between the EPS network elements (e.g., S* sessions, G*
sessions, and the like). For example, with respect to LTE network 110 of FIG.
1, the ANT 525 structures EPS elements of the LTE network 110 into Mobile
Services (e.g., eNodeBs 111, SGWs 112, PGW 113, MMEs 114, PCRF 115,
S* sessions, and the like). In this manner, a Mobile Service is a
representation of EPS network elements and EPS-related interconnectivity
between the EPS network elements.
The Mobile Service stores for each network element a list of all of the
other network elements connected to it. Thus, for a particular eNodeB, the
Mobile Service stores a list including the SGW and PGW to which the eNodeB
communicates. Similarly, for a particular SGW, the mobile service stores a
list including the eNodeBs and PGW to which the SGW communicates. Other
common or anchor elements may be used to form such bundles. These
examples contemplate, respectively, a particular eNodeB as an anchor or
common element and a particular SGW as an anchor or common element.
Other anchors or common elements may be defined within the context of the
various embodiments.
The ANT 525 may structure EPS elements of LTE network 10 into
Mobile Services using any suitable information (e.g., using the underlying
transport elements correlated to EPS-related paths from PD 524, by
processing discovery information from DD 522, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof). In one embodiment, ANT 525 is configured to
automatically create Mobile Services as areas of the LTE network 110 are
discovered by DE 521 .
Analyzer Function/Tool
The ANT 525 enables the service provider of an LTE network to have a
current view of the status of the service delivery distribution network from the
IP Core network through the eNodeB access nodes at the edge of the LTE
network. The ANT 525 enables the service provider of an LTE network to
monitor the status of the LTE network at a logical level. This is advantageous
for efficiently diagnosing problems or potential problems which may impede
delivery of mobile traffic within the LTE network. For example, equipment of
the LTE network may be operational, but misconfiguration on an SGW
instance might be blocking delivery of mobile traffic.
In various embodiments, other network parameters are monitored and
subjected to processing by the various tools and techniques discussed herein.
For example, in addition to monitoring each specific IPsec Tunnel, the IPsec
Service to which a specific tunnel belongs may also be monitored. Additional
monitoring may be provided wherever useful, such as monitoring the SEG,
the Pubiic+Private L3VPNs, the IPsec cards and groups, the interfaces and so
on. The ANT 525 enables the service provider of an LTE network to quickly
and easily identify which components of the LTE network 110 are responsible
for problems or potential problems identified at the Mobile Service level of
LTE network 110, e.g., by identifying which EPS element(s) are responsible
for the problem or potential problem, and then further identifying which
component(s) of the responsible EPS element(s) are responsible for the
problem or potential problem.
For example, this may include identifying, at the IPSec tunnel or Mobile
Service level, a specific EPS network element that is responsible for the
problem, and then drilling down on the EPS network element that is
responsible for the problem to identify components of the EPS network
element that are responsible for the problem. The components of EPS
network elements may include any components of the EPS network elements
(e.g., traffic cards, control cards, ports, interfaces, processors, memory, and
the like).
The ANT 525 may drill down on EPS elements in any suitable manner,
which may depend on the type of EPS element for which component
information is desired (e.g., using discovery information stored in DD 522 for
determining components of EPS network elements, using the path correlated
transport elements, sub-elements, systems and other information stored in PD
524 for determining components of EPS-related paths, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof). The ANT 525 may perform one or more management
functions for IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services determined by ANT 525.
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may collect statistics associated with
IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services (e.g., end-to-end statistics associated with
the IPSec tunnel or Mobile Service, statistics associated with individual
components and/or subsets of components of the IPSec tunnel or Mobile
Service, and the like, as well as combinations thereof). The ANT 525 may
analyze collected statistics for identifying the presence of congestion, or
impending presence of congestion, associated with IPSec tunnels or Mobile
Services. The ANT 525 may proactively determine, on the basis of such
analysis, solutions for resolving or preventing congestion.
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may initiate audits for verifying IPSec
tunnels or Mobile Services (e.g., for ensuring that the view of IPSec tunnels or
Mobile Services currently maintained by ANT 525 is accurate and does not
need to be updated, for use in updating the view of IPSec tunnels or Mobile
Services where such updating is required, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof).
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may initiate Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (OAM) tests for IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services.
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may perform fault analysis for IPSec
tunnels or Mobile Services. The ANT 525 may categorize detected events
based on their importance.
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may initiate generation of imagery
adapted for being displayed to provide network technicians of the service
provider with a visual representation of the event (e.g., location of the event,
scope of the event, and the like).
In one embodiment, ANT 525 may initiate one or more OAM tests (e.g.,
ping, traceroute, and the like) for the Mobile Service(s) associated with the
event, in order to determine additional information providing a better
understanding of the scope and impact of the event.
The ANT 525 may perform any other suitable management functions
associated with IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services determined by ANT 525.
Generally speaking, the analyzer tool may be invoked after the network
manager discovers the network elements and their connections as previously
described. The service aware manager identifies the LTE type network
elements, such as PGW, SGW, eNodeB, MME, PCRF, SGSN and the like.
Of primary interest are the PGW, SGW and eNodeB. Between these network
elements are EPS paths having associated reference points on the network
elements, where the EPS paths / reference points are denoted as S1-u, S5,
SGi and so on. Thus, stored in a database is a collection of modular
components, of type "network element" for the PGW, SGW, eNodeB and the
like, or type "connector" for the EPS paths.
After discovering the network elements and connectors, the service
aware manager defines a plurality of IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services by
connecting or concatenating instances of the two types of modular
components (i.e., network elements and connectors), such as the sequence
of network elements and connectors between a customer served via a
specific eNodeB and a data stream or other service received from the IP core
network at the PGW. Thus, in one embodiment, a mobile service comprises
a structure or wrapper containing a concatenated sequence of network
elements and connectors. A Mobile Service may be defined in terms of a
particular customer, a particular eNodeB, a particular APN and so on. A
mobile service may include one or more instances of an EPS on a network
element, such as one or more of an SGW or a PGW on a single or common
network element.
After defining the IPSec tunnels and/or Mobile Services, the IPSec
tunnels or Mobile Services may be analyzed or tested. Such testing may be
directed to the components forming a Mobile Service, the endpoints
associated with the Mobile Service and the like. Such testing may be directed
to specific portions of specific components or endpoint forming the Mobile
Service.
In one embodiment, individual IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services or
groups of IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services are analyzed by collecting
statistics from each of the Mobile Service modular components forming the
particular individual or groups of IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services. That is, a
Mobile Service analysis request (generated manually or automatically) is
interpreted by the management system as a request to gather statistical
information pertaining to each of the modular components (e.g., network
elements and connectors) forming a Mobile Service.
Thus, the logical representation of modular components such as
"network element" and "connector" to form IPSec tunnels or Mobile Services
enables precise auditing, analysis and tracing functions to be implemented
within the context of the various embodiments.
Auditor Function/Tool
The Audit Tool (AUT) 526 is configured to provide an audit capability
for auditing a network. The AUT 526 enables proactive auditing of network
infrastructure of a network for identifying and handling network faults or
potential network faults that are impeding or may impede end user traffic. The
AUT 526 supports quick detection of network faults or potential network faults,
impact analysis for determining the impact of faults or potential impact of
potential network faults, and rectification of any network faults or potential
network faults.
The AUT 526 provides an ability to perform in-depth network health or
sanity checks on LTE network 0 at any granularity level, e.g., for checking
the health of ports, line cards, physical connectivity, logical connectivity, S*
reference points, S* sessions, network paths, end-to-end mobile sessions of
end users, and the like, as well as combinations thereof. The AUT 526
provides significant advantages in managing LTE networks, as such networks
are inherently complex and, thus, highly susceptible to network faults that are
often difficult to correlate to mobile subscriber data that has been packetized
for transport over an IP network traversing multiple network elements that
utilize different transport technologies and applied QoS policies.
In one embodiment, AUT 526 supports auditing of interconnectivity
within LTE network 110. The auditing of interconnectivity may include
proactively monitoring for connectivity, testing connectivity, and performing
like auditing functions.
Tracer Function/Tool
The Trace Tool (TT) 527 is configured to provide a mobile session
trace capability. The mobile session trace capability enables a path of a
mobile session of a UE to be traced through a wireless network. Briefly, the
TT 527 enables a determination of the path of a IPSec tunnel or mobile
session through a wireless network and, optionally, determination of additional
information associated with the mobile session. The IPSec tunnel mobile
session trace capability enables wireless service providers to perform
management functions based on the determined path of the IPSec tunnel or
mobile session through the wireless network.
Fairness Manager Function/Tool
The Fairness Manager Tool (FMT) 528 provides various fairness
management mechanisms adapted to controlling usage of network resources
by mobile subscribers. Briefly, the FMT 528 enforces appropriate resource
(e.g., bandwidth) usage by customers, such as defined by service level
agreements (SLAs) and the like. The fairness manager enforces appropriate
bandwidth usage by any of a variety of enforcement mechanisms. The
fairness manager is operative to enforce appropriate resource consumption
levels associated with various users, groups of users, customers, third party
network purchasers and the like, whether those levels are defined by
agreement or acceptable practice.
Examples of Environment Supporting the Various Embodiments
Generally speaking, various embodiments enable a user to interact
with the management system/software and thereby to "drill down" deeper from
upper to lower hierarchical level path elements by displaying lower level path
elements associated with upper level path elements selected by a user via a
user interface. The user may be a user in a network operations center (NOC)
utilizing a computer terminal or other user workstation with a graphical user
interface (GUI)
In one embodiment, mobile session path information is displayed by
generating a "sub-map" including only the network components that support
the mobile session and displaying the generated sub-map. For example,
where the graphical display of the wireless network includes many eNodeBs,
SGWs, and PGWs, the sub-map for a mobile session will include only one of
each of those elements, as well as the sessions between each of those
elements, thereby highlighting which network elements of the wireless
network are supporting the mobile session.
In this example, the sub-map may be displayed in any suitable manner
(e.g., simultaneously in a window in a different portion of a window in which
the wireless network is displayed, in a new window opened for purposes of
displaying the sub-map, and the like). In this example, as in the previous
example, the mobile session path, or even components and sub-components
of the mobile session path (e.g., physical equipment, physical communication
links, sub-channels on physical communication links, and the like), may be
selectable such that, when selected by the user, the user is presented with
additional mobile session path information associated with the mobile session.
From such examples, it will be appreciated that display of additional
information associated with a mobile session path may be provided in any
suitable manner (e.g., refreshing within the display window to include mobile
session path information, opening a new window including mobile session
path information, and the like, as well as combinations thereof).
Implementations of the various methods optionally yield logical and/or
physical representations of one or more paths, underlying transport elements
supporting the one or more paths, as wells as various protocols, hardware,
software, firmware, domains, subnets, network element and/or sub-element
connections as discussed herein. Any of these physical and/or logical
representations may be visually represented within the context of a graphical
user interface (GUI). Moreover, the various interactions and correspondences
between these physical and/or logical representations may also be visually
represented, included representations limited to specific criteria, such as
those representations "necessary to support a path", "necessary to support a
client/customer", "associated with a single client/customer" and so on. Such
graphical representations and associated imagery provide infrastructure views
(i.e., from the perspective of one or more transport elements) or services
views (i.e., from the perspective of one or more services) of the network in
either a static or dynamic manner.
A computer suitable for use in performing the functions described
herein may include, illustratively, a processor element (e.g., a central
processing unit (CPU) and/or other suitable processor(s)), a memory (e.g.,
random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), and the like), a
management module/processor, and various input/output devices (e.g., a user
input device (such as a keyboard, a keypad, a mouse, and the like), a user
output device (such as a display, a speaker, and the like), an input port, an
output port, a receiver/ transmitter (e.g., network connection or other suitable
type of receiver/transmitter), and storage devices (e.g., a hard disk drive, a
compact disk drive, an optical disk drive, and the like)). In one embodiment,
computer software code associated with methods for invoking the various
embodiments can be loaded into the memory and executed by processor to
implement the functions as discussed herein above. The computer software
code associated with methods for invoking the various embodiments can be
stored on a computer readable storage medium, e.g., RAM memory, magnetic
or optical drive or diskette, and the like.
It should be noted that functions depicted and described herein may be
implemented in software and/or in a combination of software and hardware,
e.g., using a general purpose computer, one or more application specific
integrated circuits (ASIC), and/or any other hardware equivalents.
It is contemplated that some of the steps discussed herein as software
methods may be implemented within hardware, for example, as circuitry that
cooperates with the processor to perform various method steps. Portions of
the functions/elements described herein may be implemented as a computer
program product wherein computer instructions, when processed by a
computer, adapt the operation of the computer such that the methods and/or
techniques described herein are invoked or otherwise provided. Instructions
for invoking the inventive methods may be stored in tangible fixed or
removable media, transmitted via a data stream in a tangible or intangible
broadcast or other signal bearing medium, and/or stored within a memory
within a computing device operating according to the instructions.
Although primarily depicted and described herein with respect to
embodiments in which the management capability is used for managing an
LTE wireless network, it will be appreciated that the management capability
may be used for managing other types of wireless networks, including, but not
limited to, other types of 4G wireless networks, 3G wireless networks, 2.5G
wireless networks, 2G wireless networks, and the like, as well as
combinations thereof.
Various methods for provisioning an IPSec network upon non-secured
network infrastructure are disclosed, wherein the non-secured network
infrastructure may comprise a plurality of network elements and
communications links adapted to support a plurality of services, the method
may comprise identifying one or more switching devices in secure
communication with a secure network; retrieving configuration information
associated with the identified switching devices; determining transport layer
elements within the non-secured network infrastructure necessary to support
the IPSec network; and adapting the operation of the identified necessary
transport layer elements to the IPSec network such that secure
communication is provided between the IPSec network and the secure
network. The identifying one or more switching devices may be provided via
an entry form in a network operations center (NOC). The transport layer
elements of the non-secured network infrastructure necessary to support the
IPSec network may be identified using data correlating transport layer
elements and mobile services. The data correlating transport layer elements
and mobile services is discovered according to various techniques described
herein.
Aspects of various embodiments are specified in the claims. Those and
other aspects of various embodiments are specified in the following numbered
clauses:
1. A method for generating an secure service layer upon non-secured
network infrastructure, comprising:
receiving a service request associated with a desired IPSec service,
the service request information including at least an identification of a secure
network to be protected;
selecting at least one routing device including a boundary device for
use as a Secure Gateway (SEG);
providing a secure networking service to terminate secure traffic from
the secure network at a first portion of the boundary device;
providing a secure networking service to terminate tunneled public
traffic from a non-secure network at a second portion of the boundary device;
creating an interface to appropriately group tunneled traffic and
corresponding secure traffic to form secure network traffic paths, wherein
each group is associated with a respective encapsulation identifier.
2 . The method of clause 1, further comprising:
selecting one or more access points within the non-secure network
authorized to access the secure network.
3. The method of clause 2, wherein multiple access points within the no n
secure network are authorized to access the secure network, the method
further comprising:
associating each of the access points with an appropriate SEG; and
configuring the secure networking service of each SEG to terminate
tunneled public traffic from corresponding access points.
4 . The method of clause 1, wherein said secure networking service to
terminate secure traffic from the secure network comprises a Level 3 Virtual
Private Network (L3 VPN) service.
5. The method of clause 1, wherein said secure networking service to
terminate tunneled traffic from the non-secure network comprises one of a
Level 3 Virtual Private Network (L3 VPN) service, a VPRN (Virtual Private
Routed Network) service and a IES (Internet Enhanced Service) service.
6. The method of clause 1, wherein said secure networking service to
terminate secure traffic from the secure network enables communication
between a terminated IPSec tunnel and a Level 2 (L2) VPN secure network.
7. The method of clause 1, wherein said secure service layer comprises
an IPSec infrastructure and said tunneled public traffic comprises IPSec
tunneled traffic.
8. The method of clause 1, wherein said selecting of said at least one
routing device including a boundary device comprises:
identifying one or more routers proximate the secure network to be
protected; and
selecting one of said routers according one or more of the following
criteria: cost, proximity to customer, proximity to service provider and
utilization level.
9. The method of clause 1, wherein said generated IPSec service layer
comprises a service for securely connecting a plurality of users to said
secured network, said method further comprising further comprising:
dividing said users into a plurality of groups; and
directing traffic associated with each group to a respective access
point.
10. The method of clause 9, wherein said user groups are defined
according to user location.
11. The method of clause 10, further comprising aggregating traffic
associated with a group of users at a switching element geographically
proximate the group of users.
12. The method of clause 11, wherein said aggregated traffic includes
video services traffic, said aggregated traffic communicated between said
geographically proximate switching element and a head-end of a video
services provider.
13. The method of clause 12, wherein said video services provider
comprises one of a cable television system, a MSO, a telecommunications
systems provider and a broadcast network.
14. The method of clause 1, wherein said method is executed by a service
creation engine (SCE) instantiated within a computer associated with a
network service provider.
15. The method of clause 1, wherein said method is executed by a service
creation engine (SCE) instantiated within a network operations center (NOC)
of a network service provider.
16. The method of clause 14, wherein said request includes configuration
information associated with a type of secure connection to be made through
one or more identified access points.
17. The method of clause 14, wherein the type of secure connection
comprises an IPSec tunnel.
18. The method of clause 14, wherein the secured network comprises at
least one of a secure corporate network, a secure intranet, one or more
portions of a single third party network, and one or more portions of multiple
third party networks.
19. The method of clause 14, wherein the request further includes
identifying information associated with one or more access points in secure
communication with the secured network.
20. The method of clause 19, wherein each of said access points
comprises at least one of a switching device, a router and a bridge between
said secured network and said non-secured network.
2 1. The method of clause 20, wherein said non-secured network
comprises one of a core network and an access network.
22. The method of clause 19, wherein said access point comprises a router
including an IPSec boundary device operative to terminate IPSec traffic from
said generated IPSec service layer at said secured network.
23. The method of clause 19, wherein:
said generated IPSec layer supports secure traffic from between users
accessing said non-secure network by routing traffic from each user to
respective access points of said secured network via respective IPSec
tunnels; and
for users having different access points to said secured network, traffic
between said users is routed between said different access points via said
secured network; and
for users having a common access point to said secured network,
traffic between said users is routed directly through said common access
point.
24. The method of clause 1, further comprising adapting the operation of
one or more mobile services to according to said generated IPSec service
layer to provision thereby the desired IPSec service.
25. The method of clause , further comprising adapting the operation of
one or more transport layer elements supporting paths associated with mobile
services included within said generated IPSec service layer.
26. The method of clause 1, wherein the service request is provided via
data entered into a single form at a network operations center (NOC).
27. The method of clause 26, wherein the service request is provided via
data included within a single form by a customer, the method further
comprising reviewing the service request to validate conformance with a
service level agreement (SLA) associated with the customer.
28. The method of clause 1, wherein said request is associated with a
tunnel template including signaling parameters associated with tunneled traffic
flow.
29. The method of clause 28, wherein said tunnel template further includes
policies related to tunneled traffic flow.
30. The method of clause 29, wherein said policies include one or more of
an associated between particular IP addresses and corresponding services.
3 1. The method of clause 29, wherein said policies provide for fractional
use of IPSec tunnels.
32. The method of clause 1, further comprising:
determining whether any portions of mobile services within the
generated IPSec service traverse a non-managed network; and
forwarding, toward a manager of said non-managed network, a request
to validate the generated IPSec service conveyed via mobile service portions
associated with said non-managed network.
33. The method of clause 1, further comprising forwarding, toward a
manager of a non-managed network, a request to validate support for one or
more mobile service portions within said generated IPSec service that
traverse said non-managed network.
34. The method of clause 33, further comprising:
in response to a message indicative of a lack of support by said nonmanaged
network for a mobile service portion, forwarding toward said
manager of said non-managed network a request to adapt a provisioning of
said mobile service portion to provide support for said mobile service portion.
35. The method of clause 1, wherein data correlating each path to its
respective transport layer infrastructure is stored in a database initially
generated during a discovery process.
36. The method of clause 6, wherein said database is generated according
to the steps of iteratively correlating path structure associated with underlying
transport layer structure and storing the results of this correlation.
37. The method of clause 1, wherein the non-secure network comprises an
LTE network, the method further comprising:
identifying IES and VPRN services associated with the one or more
identified access points, each mobile service comprising at least one path,
each path supported by transport layer infrastructure within said non-secured
network; and
generating an IPSec service layer using one or more of said mobile
services.
38. A computer readable medium including software instructions which,
when executed by a processer, perform a method for generating a secure
service layer upon non-secured network infrastructure, comprising:
receiving a service request associated with a desired IPSec service,
the service request information including at least an identification of a secure
network to be protected;
selecting at least one routing device including a boundary device for
use as a Secure Gateway (SEG);
providing a secure networking service to terminate secure traffic from
the secure network at a first portion of the boundary device;
providing a secure networking service to terminate tunneled public
traffic from a non-secure network at a second portion of the boundary device;
creating an interface to appropriately group tunneled traffic and
corresponding terminated secure traffic to form secure network traffic paths,
wherein each group is associated with a respective encapsulation identifier.
39. A computer program product, wherein a computer is operative to
process software instructions which adapt the operation of the computer such
that computer performs perform a method for generating a secure service
layer upon non-secured network infrastructure, comprising:
receiving a service request associated with a desired IPSec service,
the service request information including at least an identification of a secure
network to be protected;
selecting at least one routing device including a boundary device for
use as a Secure Gateway (SEG);
providing a secure networking service to terminate secure traffic from
the secure network at a first portion of the boundary device;
providing a secure networking service to terminate tunneled public
traffic from a non-secure network at a second portion of the boundary device;
creating an interface to appropriately group tunneled traffic and
corresponding secure traffic to form secure network traffic paths, wherein
each group is associated with a respective encapsulation identifier.
40. A Secure Gateway (SEG), comprising:
a first plurality of ports accepting traffic associated with a non-secure
network;
a second plurality of ports accepting traffic associated with a secure
network; and
a boundary device adapted to provide a secure networking service to
terminate secure traffic from the secure network at a first portion, adapted to a
secure networking service to terminate tunneled public traffic from the nonsecure
network at a second portion, and adapted to create an interface to
appropriately group tunneled traffic and corresponding secure traffic to form
secure network traffic paths, wherein each group is associated with a
respective encapsulation identifier.
Although various embodiments which incorporate the teachings of the
present invention have been shown and described in detail herein, those
skilled in the art can readily devise many other varied embodiments that still
incorporate these teachings.
What is claimed is:
1. A method for generating an secure service layer upon non-secured
network infrastructure, comprising:
receiving a service request associated with a desired IPSec service,
the service request information including at least an identification of a secure
network to be protected;
selecting at least one routing device including a boundary device for
use as a Secure Gateway (SEG);
providing a secure networking service to terminate secure traffic from
the secure network at a first portion of the boundary device;
providing a secure networking service to terminate tunneled public
traffic from a non-secure network at a second portion of the boundary device;
creating an interface to appropriately group tunneled traffic and
corresponding secure traffic to form secure network traffic paths, wherein
each group is associated with a respective encapsulation identifier.
2 . The method of claim 1, further comprising:
selecting multiple access points within the non-secure network
authorized to access the secure network;
associating each of the access points with an appropriate SEG; and
configuring the secure networking service of each SEG to terminate
tunneled public traffic from corresponding access points.
3 . The method of claim 1, wherein said secure networking service to
terminate tunneled traffic from the non-secure network comprises one of a
Level 3 Virtual Private Network (L3 VPN) service, a VPRN (Virtual Private
Routed Network) service and a IES (Internet Enhanced Service) service.
4 . The method of claim 1, wherein said selecting of said at least one
routing device including a boundary device comprises:
identifying one or more routers proximate the secure network to be
protected; and
selecting one of said routers according one or more of the following
criteria: cost, proximity to customer, proximity to service provider and
utilization level.
5 . The method of claim 1, wherein said generated IPSec service layer
comprises a service for securely connecting a plurality of users to said
secured network, said method further comprising further comprising:
dividing said users into a plurality of groups defined according to user
location; and
aggregating traffic associated with each group of users at a respective
geographically proximate switching element;
wherein said aggregated traffic includes video services traffic, said
aggregated traffic communicated between said geographically proximate
switching element and a head-end of a video services provider;
said video services provider comprises one of a cable television
system, a MSO, a telecommunications systems provider and a broadcast
network.
6 . The method of claim 1, wherein said method is executed by a service
creation engine (SCE) instantiated within a computer associated with a
network operations center (NOC) of a network service provider, said service
request being provided via data entered into a single form.
7 . The method of claim 7 , wherein the secured network comprises at least
one of a secure corporate network, a secure intranet, one or more portions of
a single third party network, and one or more portions of multiple third party
networks.
8 . The method of claim 1, wherein said request is associated with a
tunnel template including signaling parameters and policies associated with
tunneled traffic flow, said policies including an association between particular
IP addresses and corresponding services.
9 . A computer readable medium including software instructions which,
when executed by a processer, perform a method for generating a secure
service layer upon non-secured network infrastructure, comprising:
receiving a service request associated with a desired IPSec service,
the service request information including at least an identification of a secure
network to be protected;
selecting at least one routing device including a boundary device for
use as a Secure Gateway (SEG);
providing a secure networking service to terminate secure traffic from
the secure network at a first portion of the boundary device;
providing a secure networking service to terminate tunneled public
traffic from a non-secure network at a second portion of the boundary device;
creating an interface to appropriately group tunneled traffic and
corresponding terminated secure traffic to form secure network traffic paths,
wherein each group is associated with a respective encapsulation identifier.
10 . A Secure Gateway (SEG), comprising:
a first plurality of ports accepting traffic associated with a non-secure
network;
a second plurality of ports accepting traffic associated with a secure
network; and
a boundary device adapted to provide a secure networking service to
terminate secure traffic from the secure network at a first portion, adapted to a
secure networking service to terminate tunneled public traffic from the non
secure network at a second portion, and adapted to create an interface to
appropriately group tunneled traffic and corresponding secure traffic to form
secure network traffic paths, wherein each group is associated with a
respective encapsulation identifier.
| # | Name | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 7902-CHENP-2012 POWER OF ATTORNEY 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 2 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-5 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 3 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 4 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-2 FIRST PAGE 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 5 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-18 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 6 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-1 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 7 | 7902-CHENP-2012 DRAWINGS 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 8 | 7902-CHENP-2012 DESCRIPTION (COMPLETE) 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 9 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 10 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CLAIMS SIGNATURE LAST PAGE 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 11 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CLAIMS 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 12 | 7902-CHENP-2012 PCT PUBLICATION 12-09-2012.pdf | 2012-09-12 |
| 13 | 7902-CHENP-2012.pdf | 2012-09-27 |
| 14 | 7902-CHENP-2012 ASSIGNMENT 05-03-2013.pdf | 2013-03-05 |
| 15 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 05-03-2013.pdf | 2013-03-05 |
| 16 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 19-06-2013.pdf | 2013-06-19 |
| 17 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 19-06-2013.pdf | 2013-06-19 |
| 18 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 08-10-2013.pdf | 2013-10-08 |
| 19 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 08-10-2013.pdf | 2013-10-08 |
| 20 | abstract7902-CHENP-2012.jpg | 2013-12-24 |
| 21 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 07-02-2014.pdf | 2014-02-07 |
| 22 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 07-02-2014.pdf | 2014-02-07 |
| 23 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 13-08-2014.pdf | 2014-08-13 |
| 24 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 13-08-2014.pdf | 2014-08-13 |
| 25 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 20-10-2014.pdf | 2014-10-20 |
| 26 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 20-10-2014.pdf | 2014-10-20 |
| 27 | 7902-CHENP-2012 FORM-3 03-03-2015.pdf | 2015-03-03 |
| 28 | 7902-CHENP-2012 CORRESPONDENCE OTHERS 03-03-2015.pdf | 2015-03-03 |
| 29 | 7902-CHENP-2012-FER.pdf | 2018-10-31 |
| 30 | 7902-CHENP-2012-AbandonedLetter.pdf | 2019-05-02 |
| 1 | search_31-10-2018.pdf |