Sign In to Follow Application
View All Documents & Correspondence

“System And Method Of Secured Transmission And Reception Of Discovery Message In Partial And Out Of Network Coverage”

Abstract: ABSTRACT METHOD OF SECURED TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF DISCOVERY MESSAGE IN A D2D COMMUNICATION SYSTEM The various embodiments of the present invention disclose a method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system. According to one embodiment, a transmitting user equipment (UE) receives a ProSe group key (PGK) from a Prose function to perform a D2D communication in a D2D public safety group. The transmitting UE then derives a ProSe traffic key (PTK) using the PGK for transmitting data packets in the D2D communication. Using the PTK, the transmitting UE further derives a Prose integrity protection key (PIK) for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs. The transmitting UE transmits the integrity protected discovery message using the derived PIK to the receiving UE. In turn, the receiving UE transmits a response message in a secure manner by deriving a PIK using PGK configured for the receiving UE. Figure 3

Get Free WhatsApp Updates!
Notices, Deadlines & Correspondence

Patent Information

Application #
Filing Date
16 January 2015
Publication Number
35/2016
Publication Type
INA
Invention Field
ELECTRONICS
Status
Email
bangalore@knspartners.com
Parent Application
Patent Number
Legal Status
Grant Date
2022-01-25
Renewal Date

Applicants

SAMSUNG R&D INSTITUTE INDIA – BANGALORE PRIVATE LIMITED
# 2870, ORION Building, Bagmane Constellation Business Park, Outer Ring Road, Doddanakundi Circle, Marathahalli Post, Bangalore -560037, Karnataka, India

Inventors

1. AGIWAL, Anil
Employed at Samsung R&D Institute India – Bangalore Private Limited, having its office at, # 2870, ORION Building, Bagmane Constellation Business Park, Outer Ring Road, Doddanakundi Circle, Marathahalli Post, Bangalore -560037, Karnataka, India
2. ii) RAJADURAI, Rajavelsamy
Employed at Samsung R&D Institute India – Bangalore Private Limited, having its office at, # 2870, ORION Building, Bagmane Constellation Business Park, Outer Ring Road, Doddanakundi Circle, Marathahalli Post, Bangalore -560037, Karnataka, India
3. CHANG, Youngbin
206-1102, GUMHO APT, SINCHON-DONG, DONGAN-GU, ANYANG, GYEONGGI, KOREA

Specification

DESC:FORM 2
THE PATENTS ACT, 1970
[39 of 1970]
&
THE PATENTS RULES, 2003
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION
(Section 10; Rule 13)

METHOD OF SECURED TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF DISCOVERY MESSAGE IN A D2D COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

SAMSUNG R&D INSTITUTE INDIA – BANGALORE Pvt. Ltd.
# 2870, ORION Building, Bagmane Constellation Business Park,
Outer Ring Road, Doddanakundi Circle,
Marathahalli Post,
Bangalore -560037, Karnataka, India
Indian Company

The following Specification particularly describes the invention
and the method it is being performed

RELATED APPLICATION
The present invention claims benefit of the Indian Provisional Application No. 263/CHE/2015 titled "SYSTEM AND METHOD OF SECURED TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF DISCOVERY MESSAGE IN PARTIAL AND OUT OF NETWORK COVERAGE” by Samsung R&D Institute India – Bangalore Private Limited, filed on 16th January 2016, which is herein incorporated in its entirety by reference for all purposes.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention generally relates to device to device (D2D) communications, and more particularly relates to a method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a D2D communication system.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Device to Device (D2D) communication is being studied in communication standard groups to enable discovery and data communication services between one or more devices. Discovery is a process which determines that a D2D-enabled User Equipment (UE) is in proximity of another D2D-enabled UE. A discovering D2D-enabled UE determines whether or not another D2D-enabled UE is of interest to the discovering D2D-enabled UE using D2D Discovery. The D2D-enabled UE is of interest to a discovering D2D-enabled UE if proximity of D2D-enabled UE needs to be known by one or more authorized applications on the discovering D2D-enabled UE. For e.g. a social networking application can be enabled to use D2D discovery feature. The D2D discovery enables the D2D-enabled UE of a given user of a social networking application to discovery and be discoverable by the D2D-enabled UEs of his/her friends. In another example, the D2D discovery can enable the D2D-enabled UE of a given user of a search application to discover stores/restaurants etc. of its interest in its proximity. In another example, the D2D-enabled public safety UE would need to discovery other D2D-enabled public safety UE, which belong to the same group, is in its proximity. Also a D2D-enabled UE may need to discover whether any group members are in its proximity. Further, the D2D-enabled UE discovers other D2D-enabled UEs in its proximity by using direct UE-to-UE signaling.

According to the existing discovery mechanism, the discovery message transmitted for discovery comprises of discovery information (discovery code), Message Integrity Code (MIC) and 4 least significant bits (LSBs) of time counter. The discovery code is a pseudo ID assigned to each user of a discovery application in the UE. In order to protect the discovery information against replay and impersonation attack a security key is assigned to each discovery code by a Prose Function and provided to the UE. The discovery message is protected as shown in Figure 1. A transmitter of discovery message secures the discovery message using the security key corresponding to the discovery code in the discovery information being transmitted. The time stamp (or time counter) corresponding to the discovery slot in which the discovery information is transmitted is also used as in input to security algorithm. The receiver of discovery message sends the received discovery information together with MIC and time stamp (or time counter) corresponding to discovery slot in which discovery message is received to the ProSe function. The Prose function validates the MIC using the security key corresponding to the discovery code.

Currently, it is being discussed to use the discovery mechanism for public safety communication to discover group members. Each public safety UE belongs to one or more groups. Figure 2A illustrates an exemplary discovery mechanism used to discover a group member. As shown in Figure 2A, a discoverable UE (also known as announcing UE) periodically announces a discovery message. A discovering UE which wants to discover another member of its group periodically monitor discovery channel for discovery message announced by the member being discovered.

Figure 2B illustrates another exemplary discovery mechanism used to discover a group member. As shown in Figure 2B, a discoverer UE which wants to discover another member of its group transmits a discovery message 1, indicating that it is searching for a specific member of its group. The discoverer UE monitors the discovery channel for a discovery message from discoveree UE after sending the discovery message 1. The discoveree UE (i.e. UE being discovered) monitors the discovery channel for discovery message 1 indicating that a discoverer UE is searching for it. If the discoveree UE receives a discovery message 1 searching for it from a discoverer UE then the discoveree UE announces a discovery message 2 with its information.

The group member discovery should be possible irrespective of whether the discovering UE and/or UE being discovered is in coverage of network or out of coverage of network (e.g., for critical communication between the public safety agents). The current discovery mechanism operates only in the coverage of network and the security validation is performed by the ProSe Function in the network (e.g., commercial use cases).

Thus, there is a need for a novel method and system for securing discovery messages which works irrespective of whether the discovering UE and/or UE being discovered is in coverage of network or out of coverage of network.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Various embodiments of the present invention herein describe a method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system is disclosed. In one embodiment, the method comprises of receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D Public Safety (PS) group, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe traffic key (PTK) from the at least one PGK for transmitting data packets in the D2D PS group, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a Prose integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PTK for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs, integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK, transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs, and receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the one or more receiving UEs derives a PIK using a PGK for allowing the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

According to one embodiment, the integrity protected discovery message comprises at least one of a PGK ID, a PTK ID, a PIK ID, a message integrity code (MIC), and a discovery code.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe Encryption key (PEK) from the derived PTK for securely transmitting data packets to the one or more receiving UEs.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of verifying, by the receiving UE, the received discovery message using the derived PIK, and transmitting the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK

According to one embodiment, the PGK is a group specific key used for ProSe PS discovery protection and identified using an 8 bit PGK ID. Also, every PGK has an expiry time.

According to one embodiment, the PTK is a group member specific traffic key for ProSe PS discovery protection and identified using a 16 bit PTK ID.

According to another embodiment, a method for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system is disclosed. The method comprises of receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety group, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a first Prose traffic key and a second Prose traffic key using the received at least one PGK for securely transmitting data packets and verifying data packets received in the D2D public safety group, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) using the derived first ProSe traffic key for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs, integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK, transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs, and receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of deriving Prose encryption Key (PEK) from the second ProSe traffic key for securing data packets to be transmitted to one or more receiving UEs.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of verifying, by the receiving UE, the received discovery message using the derived PIK, and transmitting the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK.

According to yet another embodiment, a method for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system is disclosed. The method comprises of receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), a plurality of ProSe group keys (PGKs) for a group associated with the transmitting UE to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety group, selecting, by the transmitting UE, at least one PGK from the plurality of PGKs for securing D2D discovery message and group packets for D2D group communication, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a Prose discovery key (PDK) using the selected PGK, deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PDK for securing a discovery message to be transmitted to one or more receiving UEs, integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK, transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs, and receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of configuring PGKs for in coverage use and out of coverage use by a ProSe function.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of deriving security keys for securing discovering messages using PGKs dynamically configured by a Prose function.

According to one embodiment, the method further comprises of deriving security keys for securing discovering messages using pre-configured PGKs in absence of the Prose function.

Various embodiments herein further describe an apparatus for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a device to device (D2D) communication system. The apparatus comprises of a memory, and a processor coupled to the memory, wherein the processor is adapted to: receive at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D Public Safety group, derive a ProSe traffic key (PTK) from the at least one PGK for transmitting data packets in the D2D public safety group, derive a Prose integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PTK for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs, integrity protect the discovery message using the derived PIK, transmit the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs, and receive a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

The foregoing has outlined, in general, the various aspects of the invention and is to serve as an aid to better understanding the more complete detailed description which is to follow. In reference to such, there is to be a clear understanding that the present invention is not limited to the method or application of use described and illustrated herein. It is intended that any other advantages and objects of the present invention that become apparent or obvious from the detailed description or illustrations contained herein are within the scope of the present invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The other objects, features and advantages will occur to those skilled in the art from the following description of the preferred embodiment and the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary discovery message protection, according to the prior art.

Figure 2A is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary discovery mechanism used to discover a group member, according to the prior art.

Figure 2B is a flow diagram illustrating a discovery mechanism used to discover a group member, according to the prior art.

Figure 3 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a D2D communication, according to one embodiment.

Figure 4 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary method of security key derivation for protecting a discovery message, according to one embodiment.

Figure 5 is a flow diagram illustrating a method of security key derivation for protecting a discovery message, according to another embodiment.

Figure 6 is a flow diagram illustrating a method of security key derivation for protecting a discovery message, according to yet another embodiment of the present invention.

Figure 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary discovery message protection, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Figure 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary discovery message protection, according to another embodiment of the present invention.

Although specific features of the present invention are shown in some drawings and not in others, this is done for convenience only as each feature may be combined with any or all of the other features in accordance with the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The various embodiments of the present invention disclose a method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a device to device (D2D) communication. The discovery includes ProSe Public Safety Discovery having both Relay Discovery and Group Member Discovery. In the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention, reference is made to the accompanying drawings that form a part hereof, and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. These embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention, and it is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and that changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense, and the scope of the present invention is defined only by the appended claims.

The specification may refer to “an”, “one” or “some” embodiment(s) in several locations. This does not necessarily imply that each such reference is to the same embodiment(s), or that the feature only applies to a single embodiment. Single features of different embodiments may also be combined to provide other embodiments.

As used herein, the singular forms “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless expressly stated otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “includes”, “comprises”, “including” and/or “comprising” when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof. As used herein, the term “and/or” includes any and all combinations and arrangements of one or more of the associated listed items.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this disclosure pertains. It will be further understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art and will not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein.

According to the present invention, the method of securing discovery messages works irrespective of whether the discovering UE and/or UE being discovered is in coverage of network or out of coverage of network. One of the issues for securing the discovery message for group member discovery is that which security key is used by transmitter and receiver.

Figure 3 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary method of secure transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system, according to one embodiment. The D2D communication system comprises of a transmitting UE 302, a receiving UE 304 and a Prose Function 306. At step 1 and 2, the transmitting UE 302 and the receiving UE 304 transmits a request to the Prose function 306 to participate in D2D public safety (PS) group communication. At step 3 and 4, the prose function 306 configures Prose group Key (PGK) and other credentials to the transmitting UE 302 and the receiving UE 304. A Public Safety Discovery Key (PGK) is the root key that is used for the protection of the Public Safety Discovery messages. At step 5, the transmitting UE 302 derives a Prose traffic key (PTK) using the PGK configured by the Prose function 306. Further, at step 6, the transmitting UE derives two security keys namely a Prose integrity Protection key (PIK) and ProSe encryption key (PEK) from PTK. In an embodiment, PIK is derived directly from PGK along with other possible parameters. The transmitting UE 302 uses PIK for integrity protection and transmits integrity protected discovery message to the receiving UE. The discovery message comprises at least one of a PGK ID, a PTK ID, a PIK ID, a MIC code and a discovery code. The PEK is used for securely transmitting data packets to the receiving UE 304 in an encrypted manner. The PEK also known as Discovery message Confidentiality Key is derived either using PTK or directly from PGK along with other possible parameters. At step 7, the transmitting UE 302 transmits a discovery message securely to discover the receiving UE 304. In response to the discovery message, the receiving UE at step 8 derives PTK from PGK configured by the ProSe function 306 for the receiving UE 304 to participate in D2D public safety discovery and group communication. At step 9, the receiving UE 304 further derives two security keys namely PIK and PEK for performing secure transmission and at step 10, the receiving UE verifies the message received from the transmitting UE 302 using the derived PIK. Upon verifying the message, the receiving UE 304 at step 11, transmits a response to the discovery message, wherein the discovery message is secured using PIK (may be by PEK also) derived by the receiving UE 304.

Figure 4 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary derivation of security key for protecting a discovery message, according to one embodiment. In this embodiment, consider that transmitting user equipment (UE) is a member of one of more groups and one or more Prose Group Keys (PGKs) per group are pre-configured for the transmitting UE. The one or more PGKs per group can also be dynamically configured by a ProSe Function to the transmitting UE. Each PGK is identified using 8 bit PGK ID and each PGK has corresponding expiry time. In the present invention, the PGK is used for securing both data packets and discovery messages for Prose group communication. The security keys for securing data packets and discovery messages are derived using PGK are illustrated in Figure 4. At first step 1, the transmitting UE 402 transmits a request to a ProSe function 404 to participate in device to device (D2D) communication. As a response, the ProSe function 404 at step 2 configures a Prose group key to the transmitting UE 402. At step 3, the transmitting UE 402 derives a Prose Traffic Key (PTK), which is a member specific traffic key from the PGK for securing discovery message as well as data packets of a D2D group. The derived PTK is identified using 16 bit PTK ID. The PTK is derived using key derivative function of PGK, PTK ID, group member identity of transmitter and other parameters.

PTK = KDF (PGK, FC = 0X4A, PGK ID, Length of PGK ID, PTK ID, Length of PTK ID, Group member identity of transmitter, ).

Then at step 4, the transmitting UE 402 uses the derived PTK to derive two keys namely ProSe Integrity protection key (PIK) and ProSe encryption Key (PEK), wherein both PEK and PIK is derived from PTK is as follows:
PEK= KDF (PTK, FC = 0x4B, P0 = 0x00, Length of P0, Algorithm ID, length of Algorithm ID, )).
PIK = KDF (PTK, FC = 0x4B, P0 = 0x01, Length of P0, Algorithm ID, length of Algorithm ID, )).

At step 5, the transmitting UE 402 uses the derived PIK to secure the discovery message and PEK to secure the data packets for prose group communication. In this embodiment, there is only one PGK and one PTK which is active per group for the UE.

In one embodiment, the discovery message(s) is protected using ProSe Protocol and group communication packets are protected using Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) protocol. Since, PGK and PTK is same for securing discovery message and group communication packets, the PDCP protocol and ProSe Protocol needs to coordinate with each other. In this embodiment, the Prose protocol may generate both PIK and PEK and provide PEK to PDCP protocol. Alternately, a key manager can be there in UE which maintains the keys and provide the PGK and PTK to UE and may also provide PIK and PEK to the appropriate protocol/protocol layer.

Figure 5 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary derivation of security key for protecting a discovery message, according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 5, consider that the transmitting UE 502 transmits a request to a Prose function 504 to participate in a device to device (D2D) communication, at step 1. At step 2, a Prose Group Key (PGK) is configured by the Prose function 503 to the transmitting UE 502. In one embodiment, the PGKs are pre-configured in the transmitting UE 502. In the present invention, the PGK is used for securing discovery message in addition to securing data packets for Prose group communication. At step 3, the transmitting UE 502 derives a first traffic key (PTK1) and a second traffic key (PTK2) from the configured PGK. In this embodiment, two Prose Traffic Keys, PTK1 and PTK2 are obtained from the PGK for securing discovery message and data packets of a group respectively.

PTK1 = KDF (PGK, FC = 0X4A, PGK ID, Length of PGK ID, PTK IDx, Length of PTK IDx, Group member identity of transmitter, )).

PTK2 = KDF (PGK, FC = 0X4A, PGK ID, Length of PGK ID, PTK IDy, Length of PTK IDy, Group member identity of transmitter, )).

At step 4, the transmitting UE 502 derives a Prose integrity key (PIK) from the derived PTK 1 and derives Prose Encryption key (PEK) from the derived PTK2. The keys are derived as follows.
PEK = KDF (PTK2, FC = 0x4B, P0 = 0x00, Length of P0, Algorithm ID, length of Algorithm ID, )).

PIK = KDF (PTK1, FC = 0x4B, P0 = 0x00 or 0x01, Length of P0, Algorithm ID, length of Algorithm ID, )).

At step 5, the derived PIK is used to secure the discovery message and PEK is used to secure the data packets for prose group communication. In this embodiment, it is assumed that there is one PGK and two PTK which are active per group for the UE.

In one embodiment, the discovery message is protected using ProSe Protocol and group communication packets are protected using PDCP protocol. The Prose Protocol generates the PTK 1 and PIK where the PDCP protocol generates the PTK2 and PEK.

Figure 6 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary derivation of security key for protecting a discovery message, according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 6, at step 1, a transmitting UE 602 transmits a request to a Prose function 604 to participate in a device to device (D2D) communication. At step 2, the ProSe function 604 configures a Prose Group key to the transmitting UE 602. The transmitting UE 602 is a member of one or more groups and each group has one or more Prose Group Keys (PGKs). In one embodiment, the transmitting UE is pre-configured with the one or more PGKs or PGKs can be dynamically configured by a ProSe function to the transmitting UE. The transmitting UE transmits a discovery message for group member discovery using PGK. In this embodiment, separate PGKs are used for securing discovery message and securing data packets for a D2D group communication. The separate PGKs for discovery and communication may be explicitly configured. Alternately, at step 3, the transmitting UE 602 selects different PGKs for discovery and communication. At step 4, a Prose Discovery Key (PDK) is derived from the selected PGK for securing discovery message. The derivation of PDK key is explained as follows.

The security key, PDK is derived as follows:
PDK = KDF (PGK-Discovery, FC = 0X4A, PGK ID, Length of PGK ID, PDK ID, Length of PDK ID, Group member identity of transmitter, )).

At step 5, the derived PDK is then used by the transmitting UE 602 to derive a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK). The PIK is derived as follows
PIK = KDF (PDK, FC = 0x4B, P0 = 0x00 or 0x01, Length of P0, Algorithm ID, length of Algorithm ID, )).

The transmitting UE then transmits the discovery message with PIK to discover a receiving UE in the D2D group. Similarly, the receiving UE also generates PDK and PIK using PGK configured for the receiving UE and transmits the response to the discovery message along with the derived PIK thereby ensuring secured transmission.

Figure 7 illustrates an enhanced discovery message protection mechanism, according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 7, a security key specific to member, discovery information to be transmitted and time stamp/ time counter corresponding to discovery slot in which discovery information is transmitted is provided as input to security algorithm. The security algorithm generates a message integrity code (MIC). The MIC, PGK ID, PTK ID and 4LSBS of time counter together with discovery information is transmitted by the transmitter UE. In one embodiment, discovery information is also encrypted. In one embodiment, the Source UE ID and/or Group ID are also added in discovery message. They can be added in public safety (PS) discovery information. Further, the Source UE ID and/or Group ID can be added in protocol headers (e.g. MAC header) and can be transmitted to a receiving UE. The receiving UE determines a security key to be used using the PGK ID, PTK ID, source UE ID and Group ID received. The receiving UE, then decrypt and/or verify MIC received from the transmitting UE using the determined security key.

Figure 8 illustrates an exemplary enhanced discovery message protection mechanism, according to another embodiment. In this enhanced discovery message protection, the discovery information is transmitted using parameters as mentioned in figure 7 along with PDU type field and a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) sequence number (SN) field in which the field PDCP SN is optional in some cases. An out of coverage UE can maintain time counter using the universal coordinated time (UTC) time information provided by the synchronization source including but not limited to example, GPS, time function. Alternately, in coverage UE can relay the UTC time information to the out of coverage UE.

In one embodiment, the ProSe Function configures security credentials (for example, PGK, security algorithm) and other configurations (for example, radio configuration, ProSe application configuration, like so) for in coverage UE. The ProSe Function also configures security credentials (for example, PGK, security algorithm) and other configurations (for example, radio configuration, ProSe application configuration, like so) for out of coverage UE. The Prose function may configure the above configurations to in coverage and/or out of coverage using other RATs (e.g. 2G/3G/5G/WLAN). The UE may also be pre-configured with PGKs which are used when the UE has no access to ProSe Function. In case of partial coverage (i.e. TX UE is in coverage and RX UE is out of coverage or vice versa), there is mismatch between the PGK used at transmitter and receiver. In the present invention this mismatch is handled as follows:

First, the in coverage (IC) TX UE determines whether there are RX UEs in out of coverage (OOC). The IC TX UE determines OOC RX UEs using the following options. Firstly, the IC TX UE adds one bit indication in discovery message and transmits the same to the OOC RX UE. The OOC UE sets the one bit indication value to 1 and transmits the discovery message to the IC TX UE. In coverage UE checks for one bit indication that is received from the OOC RX UE before transmitting.

Secondly, the in coverage UE determines OOC UE by detection of D2DSS from OOC UE or 1 bit indication in D2DSCH. Thirdly, the in coverage UE determines OOC UE by the PGK ID used in the discovery and/or data (D2D user plane) packet. The IDs are assigned unique or in sequence (no repetition) for Pre-Configured and in coverage configuration. If the in coverage TX UE determines that there are OOC RX UEs, the in coverage TX UE uses the PGK from the Pre-configured PGKs. If there are no OOC RX UEs, then the IC TX UE uses the PGK configured by the Prose function.

In one embodiment, if the TX UE is in out of coverage, then the OOC TX UE always uses the PGK from the Pre-configured PGKs as it does not have access to ProSe Function. The in coverage RX UE determines the PGK used using pre-configured parameters for discovery message received from OOC UE. Otherwise, the in coverage RX UE determines the PGK used using parameters configured by ProSe Function for discovery message received from IC UE.

In another embodiment, the ProSe Function is aware of Pre-configured PGKs. Hence, the ProSe Function configures the same or a subset of PGKs from the Pre-configured PGKs for deriving security keys. In yet another embodiment, the in coverage TX UE uses the PGK from the Pre-configured PGKs. This means that PGKs are not configured by ProSe Function.

In a further embodiment, the indexes of distinct PGKs in pre configuration and in the configuration performed by ProSe Function are distinct. Therefore, if same PGK is there in pre configuration and in the configuration performed by ProSe Function, then its PGK ID is same. The TX UE in coverage follows the same procedure as mentioned in previous embodiments. And the RX UE in coverage determines the PGK used using both the pre configuration and configuration performed by ProSe Function.

In one embodiment, an out of coverage public safety (PS) UE communicate with an in coverage UE using a UE-NW relay. For that, the OOC PS UE needs to discover the UE-NW relay. In order for OOC PS UE to discover UE-NW relay, the UE-NW Relay first transmits discovery message. If the UE-NW relay uses the security key corresponding to group which it belongs, then only group members of relay can discover relay. This is an issue as relay should be discoverable by all PS UEs. So in this embodiment, PS UE having UE-NW Relay capability can be assigned a ProSe relay Key (PRK) for relay purpose. A common PRK is available in the system which is provided to each PS UE in addition to PGKs.

Although the invention of the method and system has been described in connection with the embodiments of the present invention illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it is not limited thereto. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various substitutions, modifications and changes may be made thereto without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention.

,CLAIMS:We claim:

1. A method of secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system, comprising:
receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D Public Safety (PS) group;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe traffic key (PTK) from the at least one PGK for transmitting data packets in the D2D PS group;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a Prose integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PTK for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the one or more receiving UEs derives a PIK using a PGK for allowing the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the integrity protected discovery message comprises at least one of a PGK ID, a PTK ID, a PIK ID, a message integrity code (MIC), and a discovery code.

3. The method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising:
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe Encryption key (PEK) from the derived PTK for securely transmitting data packets to the one or more receiving UEs.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising:
verifying, by the receiving UE, the received discovery message using the derived PIK; and
transmitting the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK.

5. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the PGK is a group specific key used for ProSe PS discovery protection and identified using an 8 bit PGK ID.

6. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein every PGK has an expiry time.

7. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the PTK is a group member specific traffic key for ProSe PS discovery protection and identified using a 16 bit PTK ID.

8. A method for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system, comprising:
receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety group;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a first Prose traffic key and a second Prose traffic key using the received at least one PGK for securely transmitting data packets and verifying data packets received in the D2D public safety group;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) using the derived first ProSe traffic key for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

9. The method as claimed in claim 7, further comprising:
deriving Prose encryption Key (PEK) from the derived second ProSe traffic key for securing data packets to be transmitted to the one or more receiving UEs.

10. The method as claimed in claim 8, further comprising:
verifying, by the receiving UE, the received discovery message using the derived PIK; and
transmitting the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK.

11. A method for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system, comprising:
receiving, by a transmitting user equipment (UE), a plurality of ProSe group keys (PGKs) for a group associated with the transmitting UE to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety group;
selecting, by the transmitting UE, at least one PGK from the plurality of PGKs for securing D2D discovery message and group packets for D2D group communication;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a Prose discovery key (PDK) using the selected PGK;
deriving, by the transmitting UE, a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PDK for securing a discovery message to be transmitted to one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protecting, by the transmitting UE, the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmitting, by the transmitting UE, the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receiving, by the transmitting UE, a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

12. The method as claimed in claim 11, further comprising:
configuring PGKs for one or more UEs in coverage use and out of coverage use by a ProSe function.

13. The method as claimed in claim 11, further comprising:
deriving security keys for securing discovering messages using PGKs dynamically configured by the Prose function.

14. The method as claimed in claim 11, further comprising:
deriving security keys for securing discovering messages using pre-configured PGKs in absence of the Prose function.

15. An apparatus for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a device to device (D2D) communication system comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory, wherein the processor is adapted to:
receive at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D Public Safety group;
derive a ProSe traffic key (PTK) from the at least one PGK for transmitting data packets in the D2D public safety group;
derive a Prose integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PTK for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protect the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmit the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receive a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

16. The apparatus as claimed in claim 15, further causes the processor to:
derive a ProSe Encryption key (PEK) from the derived PTK for securely transmitting data packets to one or more receiving UEs.

17. The apparatus as claimed in claim 15, further causes the processor to:
verify the received discovery message using the derived PIK; and
transmit the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK.

18. An apparatus for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in a device to device (D2D) communication system, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory is adapted to:
receive at least one ProSe group key (PGK) to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety (PS) group;
derive a first Prose traffic key and a second Prose traffic key using the received at least one PGK for securely transmitting data packets and verifying data packets received in the D2D PS group;
derive a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) using the first ProSe traffic key for securing a discovery message to discover one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protect the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmit the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receive a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

19. The apparatus as claimed in claim 18, further causes the processor to:
derive a Prose encryption Key (PEK) from the derived second ProSe traffic key for securing data packets to be transmitted to one or more receiving UEs.

20. A apparatus for secured transmission and reception of discovery message in device to device (D2D) communication system, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory is adapted to:
receive a plurality of ProSe group keys (PGKs) for a group associated with the transmitting UE to perform a secure D2D discovery in a D2D public safety group;
select one PGK from the plurality of PGKs for securing D2D discovery message and group packets for D2D group communication;
derive a Prose discovery key (PDK) using the selected PGK;
derive a ProSe integrity protection key (PIK) from the derived PDK for securing a discovery message to be transmitted to one or more receiving UEs;
integrity protect the discovery message using the derived PIK;
transmit the integrity protected discovery message to the one or more receiving UEs; and
receive a response to the discovery message from the one or more receiving UEs, wherein the receiving UE derives a PIK using a PGK for the receiving UE to securely transmit the response.

21. The apparatus as claimed in claim 20, further causes the processor to:
verify the received discovery message using the derived PIK; and
transmit the response to the discovery message securely using the derived PIK.

Dated this the 14th day of January 2016

Signature

KEERTHI JS
Patent agent
Agent for the applicant

Documents

Application Documents

# Name Date
1 SRIB-20150116-002_Provisional Specification_ Filed with IPO on 16th January 2015.pdf 2015-03-12
2 SRIB-20150116-002_Drawings_Filed with IPO on 16th January 2015.pdf 2015-03-12
3 POA_Samsung R&D Institute India-new.pdf 2015-03-12
4 OTHERS [14-01-2016(online)].pdf 2016-01-14
5 Drawing [14-01-2016(online)].pdf 2016-01-14
6 Description(Complete) [14-01-2016(online)].pdf 2016-01-14
7 REQUEST FOR CERTIFIED COPY [02-02-2016(online)].pdf_26.pdf 2016-02-02
8 REQUEST FOR CERTIFIED COPY [02-02-2016(online)].pdf 2016-02-02
9 Request For Certified Copy-Online.pdf 2016-02-10
10 263-CHE-2015-FORM 3 [28-12-2017(online)].pdf 2017-12-28
11 263-CHE-2015-FER.pdf 2019-09-20
12 263-CHE-2015-FORM 13 [25-10-2019(online)].pdf 2019-10-25
13 263-CHE-2015-FORM-26 [10-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-10
14 263-CHE-2015-Proof of Right [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
15 263-CHE-2015-PETITION UNDER RULE 137 [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
16 263-CHE-2015-OTHERS [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
17 263-CHE-2015-Information under section 8(2) [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
18 263-CHE-2015-FORM 3 [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
19 263-CHE-2015-FER_SER_REPLY [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
20 263-CHE-2015-CORRESPONDENCE [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
21 263-CHE-2015-COMPLETE SPECIFICATION [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
22 263-CHE-2015-CLAIMS [20-03-2020(online)].pdf 2020-03-20
23 263-CHE-2015-FORM-26 [29-03-2021(online)].pdf 2021-03-29
24 263-CHE-2015-Correspondence to notify the Controller [29-03-2021(online)].pdf 2021-03-29
25 263-CHE-2015-Correspondence to notify the Controller [14-04-2021(online)].pdf 2021-04-14
26 263-CHE-2015-Written submissions and relevant documents [06-05-2021(online)].pdf 2021-05-06
27 263-CHE-2015-RELEVANT DOCUMENTS [06-05-2021(online)].pdf 2021-05-06
28 263-CHE-2015-PETITION UNDER RULE 137 [06-05-2021(online)].pdf 2021-05-06
29 263-CHE-2015-Annexure [06-05-2021(online)].pdf 2021-05-06
30 263-CHE-2015-Correspondence to notify the Controller [09-09-2021(online)].pdf 2021-09-09
31 263-CHE-2015-Written submissions and relevant documents [28-09-2021(online)].pdf 2021-09-28
32 263-CHE-2015-Annexure [28-09-2021(online)].pdf 2021-09-28
33 263-CHE-2015-US(14)-HearingNotice-(HearingDate-14-04-2021).pdf 2021-10-17
34 263-CHE-2015-US(14)-ExtendedHearingNotice-(HearingDate-21-04-2021).pdf 2021-10-17
35 263-CHE-2015-US(14)-ExtendedHearingNotice-(HearingDate-13-09-2021).pdf 2021-10-17
36 263-CHE-2015-PatentCertificate25-01-2022.pdf 2022-01-25
37 263-CHE-2015-IntimationOfGrant25-01-2022.pdf 2022-01-25

Search Strategy

1 Search_Strategy_263CHE2015_11-09-2019.pdf

ERegister / Renewals

3rd: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2017 - To 16/01/2018

4th: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2018 - To 16/01/2019

5th: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2019 - To 16/01/2020

6th: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2020 - To 16/01/2021

7th: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2021 - To 16/01/2022

8th: 12 Apr 2022

From 16/01/2022 - To 16/01/2023

9th: 29 Dec 2022

From 16/01/2023 - To 16/01/2024

10th: 16 Jan 2024

From 16/01/2024 - To 16/01/2025

11th: 16 Jan 2025

From 16/01/2025 - To 16/01/2026