Description:1. FIELD OF INVENTION
The present invention relates to a novel class of hardware security devices, methods, and systems — collectively termed a Hardware-Rooted Cryptographic Attestation Platform — that provides cryptographically verifiable proof of physical measurement integrity at the point of capture, without dependence on software-only data entry. The platform employs a portable, field-deployable USB-C hardware device containing a tamper-resistant secure element to sign physical measurement data using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and, in extended embodiments, post-quantum cryptographic algorithms compliant with NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA). Signed certificates are anchored on a public distributed ledger, creating permanent, third-party-verifiable compliance records.

The invention has principal application in agricultural supply chain compliance (EU Deforestation Regulation), pharmaceutical batch record integrity (US FDA 21 CFR Part 11, EU GMP), aerospace and defence component provenance (AS9100, NADCAP), electric vehicle battery digital passports (EU Battery Regulation 2027), fashion and textile supply chain compliance (EU CSRD), and liquor and spirits authenticity verification. The core hardware architecture is sector-agnostic: only the sensor input, regulatory context, and certificate schema change between applications.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
2.1 The Fundamental Problem: Software-Only Attestation Has No Hardware Root of Trust
Across every regulated industry, the same fundamental vulnerability exists: physical measurements and observations are captured by human agents using general-purpose computing devices (smartphones, laptops, tablets) and entered manually into enterprise software systems (SAP, Oracle, ERP platforms, compliance software). This data entry process — however well-audited in software — has no cryptographic link to the physical act of measurement. Data can be modified between physical capture and system entry, modified within the ERP before regulatory submission, or fabricated entirely without physical measurement occurring.

Existing hardware security devices (YubiKey, FIDO2 authenticators, HSMs) address user identity authentication and network security, not physical measurement integrity at the point of production or collection. RFID tags on physical products prove tag presence, not measurement conditions. Blockchain supply chain platforms (IBM Food Trust, Walmart's system, TrusTrace) anchor data on distributed ledgers but rely entirely on software-layer data entry — the blockchain proves the data was not changed after entry, not that it was correct at entry.

The present invention fills this gap by inserting a cryptographic signing event at the moment of physical measurement, using hardware whose private key is mathematically non-extractable. The signed data anchored on blockchain creates a chain of provenance from physical reality to regulatory filing that cannot be broken or fabricated at any intermediate point.

2.2 The Post-Quantum Urgency
Current hardware secure elements (including Microchip ATECC608A) implement ECDSA P-256, which is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalised three post-quantum cryptographic standards in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205). NIST's transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) indicates that quantum-vulnerable algorithms will be deprecated from federal standards by 2035. Compliance records created today — particularly in aerospace (component lifetime 30-50 years), pharma (record retention 15+ years), and battery passports (battery lifetime 15-20 years) — must remain cryptographically valid against future quantum threats. The present invention's architecture explicitly accommodates post-quantum algorithm migration.

3. OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION
1. To provide a portable hardware attestation device deployable across multiple regulated industries that signs physical measurement data at the moment of capture, eliminating the gap between physical reality and digital record.
2. To provide a novel GPS-free physical presence verification method using hardware timestamp correlation via USB physical coupling constraint.
3. To provide a post-quantum cryptographic extension enabling migration from classical ECDSA to NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA without hardware replacement.
4. To provide hardware-signed batch manufacturing record integrity for pharmaceutical regulatory compliance eliminating manual ERP data entry vulnerabilities.
5. To provide hardware-signed component measurement provenance for aerospace and defence safety-critical manufacturing, creating tamper-proof dimensional, torque, and material attestation at the point of shop floor measurement.
6. To provide hardware-signed battery formation data creating a cryptographic birth certificate for EV battery cells compliant with EU Battery Regulation 2027 digital passport requirements.
7. To provide hardware-signed fabric and garment provenance chains for fashion and textile CSRD compliance, and hardware-signed spectral fingerprint attestation for spirits and liquor authenticity.
8. To expose the platform as a sector-agnostic commercial API enabling third parties to integrate hardware-rooted attestation without building cryptographic or blockchain infrastructure.

4. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The invention provides a Hardware-Rooted Cryptographic Attestation Platform comprising three invariant architectural layers and multiple sector-specific application embodiments:

Invariant Layer 1 — The Attestation Device:
A portable USB-C hardware device containing a microcontroller with native USB support and a hardware secure element with a non-extractable ECC or post-quantum private key. The device receives measurement data from a paired application, signs it at the moment of capture, and returns the signature with a hardware timestamp. The private key is generated on-device and sealed by a one-time programmable lock.

Invariant Layer 2 — Physical Presence Verification:
A novel method exploiting the physical coupling constraint of USB connectivity as a proxy for agent presence at the measurement point. The temporal delta between hardware signing timestamp and backend receipt timestamp serves as cryptographic evidence of physical presence without requiring GPS.

Invariant Layer 3 — Blockchain Certificate Anchoring:
A backend system that verifies the hardware signature against the registered device public key, generates a compliance certificate combining measurement data and hardware attestation status, and anchors the certificate hash on a public distributed ledger for permanent third-party verification.

Sector-Specific Embodiments:
The platform is applied to six regulated sectors: (1) Agricultural deforestation compliance (EUDR), (2) Pharmaceutical batch manufacturing records (FDA/EMA), (3) Aerospace component dimensional provenance (AS9100/NADCAP), (4) EV battery formation passports (EU Battery Regulation), (5) Fashion/textile supply chain (CSRD), and (6) Spirits/liquor spectral fingerprint authentication.

Post-Quantum Extension:
All embodiments include architectural provisions for migration to NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA post-quantum digital signatures, protecting compliance records against future quantum computational threats for the duration of their regulatory retention period.

 
5. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
5.1 Core Hardware Architecture
In the preferred embodiment, the attestation device comprises a USB-C female connector, an ATmega32U4 or equivalent microcontroller with native USB-HID and USB-serial support, and a Microchip ATECC608A-SSHDA-B TrustCustom secure element communicating via I2C. The microcontroller bridges USB serial communication from the paired application to I2C commands to the secure element. During provisioning, the GenKey command generates an ECC P-256 key pair internally; the configuration zone is then permanently locked. In post-quantum embodiments (v2+), the secure element or microcontroller firmware implements ML-DSA signature generation using lattice-based arithmetic on a hardware module compliant with NIST FIPS 204.

5.2 The Universal Signing Flow
9. A field agent or operator connects the attestation device to a paired mobile or desktop application via USB-C.
10. The application constructs a measurement payload comprising: measurement values, operator ID, device ID, timestamp, and application-specific metadata (lot ID, batch number, part serial, battery cell ID, etc.).
11. The application transmits the payload to the device via USB serial. The device firmware computes a SHA-256 digest and invokes the secure element Sign command.
12. The secure element returns a 64-byte ECDSA P-256 signature (or ML-DSA signature in post-quantum embodiments) and the hardware signs a timestamp.
13. The application transmits the signed payload, signature, and device ID to the compliance backend. The backend records T_receive.
14. The backend verifies the ECC signature against the registered public key for device_id. If valid, it computes delta_T = T_receive - T_sign and applies the temporal presence threshold test.
15. The backend generates a compliance certificate and anchors its SHA-256 hash on the Polygon blockchain or equivalent public distributed ledger.

5.3 Physical Presence Verification Method
The novel GPS-free physical presence method: since a valid hardware signature can only be obtained by a device physically connected via USB to the application — the USB connection is a physical coupling constraint requiring spatial proximity — a delta_T within the configured threshold (default 300 seconds) constitutes evidence that the operator was physically present at the measurement location with the device at T_sign. Certificates where delta_T exceeds the threshold are flagged as temporal anomalies. This method is particularly valuable in environments where GPS accuracy is degraded (dense canopy, underground, indoor industrial).

5.3a Hybrid Classical-Post-Quantum Signing Architecture
In the preferred hybrid embodiment, the attestation device produces two independent digital signatures for each measurement payload. The first signature is generated by the ATECC608A hardware secure element using ECDSA P-256 — hardware-bound and non-extractable, providing classical cryptographic proof with hardware root of trust. The second signature is generated by the paired mobile or desktop computing device using ML-DSA compliant with NIST FIPS 204, implemented in software — for example using the ML-DSA implementation in Microsoft .NET 10 (System.Security.Cryptography.MLDsa class, available from .NET 10 build 10.0.0 onwards), Python pqcrypto libraries, or equivalent FIPS 204 compliant implementation. The ML-DSA private key is stored in the paired device's secure enclave or software keystore.
The compliance certificate includes both signatures. Backend verification can use either signature independently: the ECDSA signature for current classical verification, and the ML-DSA signature for future quantum-resistant verification. This hybrid architecture provides immediate deployability on current hardware while establishing a cryptographic record that remains verifiable against quantum computational attacks for the full regulatory retention period of the compliance document — 5 years minimum under EUDR, 15+ years under FDA 21 CFR Part 11, and 30-50 years under aerospace AS9100 component lifecycle requirements.

5.4 Sector-Specific Embodiments
Embodiment A — Agricultural Deforestation Compliance (EUDR)
Field agents use the device at agricultural commodity collection centres. The measurement payload includes: lot ID, farm ID, commodity weight, farm polygon GPS coordinates (from paired phone), photograph hash, and collection timestamp. The backend performs a three-source deforestation check combining Global Forest Watch GLAD alerts, EU JRC Global Forest Cover 2020 (the official EUDR reference dataset at 10-metre resolution), and Google Earth Engine historical land use analysis. The combined risk assessment and hardware attestation are anchored on the Polygon blockchain. Target regulation: EU Regulation 2023/1115 (EUDR), enforcement December 2026.

Embodiment B — Pharmaceutical Batch Manufacturing Record Integrity
A secure bench-top or floor-standing weighing and measurement station incorporates the attestation device. At every critical quality control measurement — batch weight, yield, pH, assay result, in-process test — the operator connects the device, which signs the measurement value, operator badge ID, equipment calibration certificate hash, and timestamp at the moment of measurement, before any entry into SAP or equivalent ERP. The hardware signature creates a cryptographic anchor between the physical measurement event and the regulatory submission. Regulatory submissions to CDSCO, US FDA (under 21 CFR Part 11), or EMA include the hardware-signed measurement hash, proving data was not altered between physical measurement and filing. This eliminates the category of data integrity failures that trigger FDA import alerts. Target regulation: US FDA 21 CFR Part 11, EU GMP Annex 11, Indian CDSCO Schedule M.

Embodiment C — Aerospace and Defence Component Dimensional Provenance
A handheld dimensional measurement probe (caliper, micrometer, torque wrench, or material spectrometer) is equipped with the attestation device as an integrated or plug-in module. At the moment of physical measurement on the shop floor — torque value on a fastener, dimensional tolerance of a machined part, alloy composition of a raw material — the device signs the measurement value, operator certification number, equipment calibration hash, part serial number, and timestamp. This signed measurement is written to the part's digital twin and generates a QR or DataMatrix code on the part label. The signed record proves that a certified operator performed a certified measurement on a specific instrument at a specific time — not that a QA technician entered a number into SAP from memory hours later. Counterfeit component detection: a signed measurement that does not match the part specification triggers an immediate non-conformance alert that is cryptographically non-repudiable. Target standards: AS9100 Rev D, NADCAP, MIL-STD-130, DEF STAN 05-135. Target customers: HAL, DRDO, Boeing India supply chain, Safran, GE Aviation India, Tata Advanced Systems. Funding pathway: iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence) grants up to INR 1.5 crore.

Embodiment D — EV Battery Digital Passport (EU Battery Regulation)
At the battery cell or pack assembly station, the attestation device signs electrochemical formation data at the moment of first charge cycle completion: rated capacity (Ah), internal resistance (mOhm), temperature profile during formation, Coulombic efficiency, and cell/pack serial number. This signed formation data constitutes the cryptographic birth certificate of the battery — the first and only hardware-verifiable record of the battery's actual as-manufactured state. When the battery enters end-of-life processing for second-life reuse or recycling, the birth certificate verifies the battery's actual formation history, enabling accurate state-of-health estimation and a genuine second-life market based on verified data rather than undocumented assumptions. Target regulation: EU Battery Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, digital battery passport requirements effective 2027. Target customers: Ola Electric, Tata Motors EV, Mahindra Electric, Exide Industries, Amara Raja, and all manufacturers receiving PLI scheme funding under India's INR 18,100 crore Advanced Chemistry Cell PLI.

Embodiment E — Fashion and Textile Supply Chain Provenance (CSRD)
A factory-floor scanning station incorporates the attestation device. At the point of fabric roll receipt and cutting, the operator scans the fabric roll barcode or RFID tag, and the device signs: fabric roll ID, GSM (weight per square metre measured physically on station scale), mill origin certificate hash, weave specification code, and timestamp. This signed record is linked to the garment's NFC tag, creating a hardware-attested provenance chain: certified mill → hardware-signed cutting record → assembler → finished garment. Each step in the chain carries a hardware signature from the physical manufacturing event. EU CSRD requires fashion brands sourcing from India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam to prove material sourcing by 2026. Target regulation: EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), EU Textile Labelling Regulation. Target customers: garment export manufacturers in Tiruppur, Surat, and Bengaluru supplying H&M, Zara, and Inditex.

Embodiment F — Spirits and Liquor Spectral Fingerprint Authentication
A bottling line attachment integrates a near-infrared (NIR) micro-spectrometer (approximately INR 8,000 component cost) with the attestation device. At the moment of bottle sealing, the spectrometer captures a spectral fingerprint of the liquid — a 256-point NIR absorbance signature unique to the liquid composition — and the device signs: spectral fingerprint hash, batch distillation date, distillery ID, bottling line ID, and timestamp. The signature is encoded in a QR code or NFC tag on the bottle cap or label. Verification: a customer, excise officer, or customs inspector scans the bottle, the verification platform retrieves the signed spectral fingerprint from the blockchain, re-measures the liquid if suspected counterfeit, and compares. A bottle refilled with cheaper alcohol cannot match the original signed spectral fingerprint. This is hardware-verified liquid identity — the first cryptographically provable link between what is actually inside the bottle and the distillery production record. Target customers: United Spirits (Diageo India), Pernod Ricard India, Allied Blenders and Distillers, Radico Khaitan, state excise departments.
, Claims:Claim 1 — The Hardware Attestation Device (Independent)
A portable cryptographic hardware attestation device for physical measurement integrity, comprising:
(a) a USB-C interface physically connectable to a paired computing device for power supply and bidirectional serial data communication;
(b) a microcontroller with native USB support providing USB-to-I2C protocol bridging;
(c) a hardware secure element comprising a non-extractable asymmetric private key generated on-device during provisioning and sealed by a one-time programmable configuration lock, said secure element being capable of generating digital signatures and hardware-quality random numbers without exposing the private key to any external interface;
(d) firmware executing on the microcontroller configured to: receive a physical measurement data payload from the paired computing device via USB serial; compute a cryptographic digest of the payload; invoke the secure element to sign the digest using the sealed private key; and return the resulting digital signature and a hardware-generated timestamp to the paired computing device;
wherein the device form factor and USB-C interface enable deployment by non-technical operators at remote or industrial measurement locations without fixed power or network infrastructure, and wherein the sealed private key physically cannot be read, exported, or duplicated from the secure element by any party including the device manufacturer.

Claim 2 — Physical Presence Verification Method (Independent)
A method for verifying operator physical presence at a data collection point without satellite positioning, the method comprising:
(a) receiving, at a hardware attestation device physically connected to a paired computing device via USB, a measurement data payload constructed by an application executing on the paired device;
(b) signing the payload digest within the hardware secure element using the sealed private key, recording a hardware signing timestamp T_sign;
(c) transmitting the signed payload, digital signature, and T_sign from the paired device to a compliance backend via a network connection;
(d) recording at the backend a receipt timestamp T_receive;
(e) computing temporal delta: delta_T = T_receive minus T_sign;
(f) verifying operator physical presence by determining that delta_T is within a configurable threshold period, exploiting the physical coupling constraint that a valid hardware signature requires the attestation device to be physically connected via USB to the paired computing device, such that the temporal correlation constitutes cryptographic evidence of operator presence at the collection point at T_sign;
(g) flagging as a temporal anomaly and escalating for review any certificate where delta_T exceeds the configured threshold;
wherein the method achieves regulatory-grade physical presence attestation without GPS receiver, satellite infrastructure, or network connectivity at the device.

Claim 3 — The Multi-Layer Compliance System (Independent)
A physical measurement integrity system for regulatory compliance, comprising:
(a) a hardware attestation layer as claimed in Claim 1 providing signed measurement certificates with hardware timestamps;
(b) a physical presence verification layer as claimed in Claim 2;
(c) a backend verification module that authenticates the hardware digital signature against the registered device public key stored in a device registry;
(d) a compliance certificate generator producing a structured certificate combining verified measurement data, hardware attestation status, operator identity, device identity, and applicable regulatory context metadata;
(e) a blockchain anchoring module that anchors a cryptographic hash of the compliance certificate on a public distributed ledger, creating a permanent, tamper-evident, publicly verifiable record;
(f) a public verification interface providing third-party access to certificate status and blockchain verification without requiring contact with the system operator;
wherein the combination creates an unbroken chain of cryptographic provenance from physical measurement event to regulatory filing that cannot be fabricated, backdated, or altered at any intermediate point.

Claim 4 — Post-Quantum Cryptographic Extension (Dependent on Claim 1)
The hardware attestation device of Claim 1, wherein the hardware secure element additionally or alternatively implements a post-quantum digital signature algorithm, comprising:
(a) a Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) compliant with NIST FIPS 204, or a Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA) compliant with NIST FIPS 205, or an equivalent lattice-based or hash-based post-quantum signature scheme resistant to attacks by quantum computers implementing Shor's algorithm;
(b) firmware architecture providing crypto-agility such that the signature algorithm can be migrated from classical ECDSA to post-quantum ML-DSA via firmware update of the microcontroller layer, without requiring physical replacement of the hardware device or re-provisioning of the secure element key storage;
(c) hybrid signature mode wherein the device generates both an ECDSA P-256 classical signature and an ML-DSA post-quantum signature for each measurement payload, providing backward compatibility with classical verification systems while establishing post-quantum security for future verification;
wherein certificates issued by the device remain cryptographically unforgeable against both classical and quantum computational adversaries, with a projected security horizon exceeding 30 years from issuance — sufficient to encompass the full regulatory retention period of aerospace component records (30-50 year aircraft lifecycle), pharmaceutical batch records (15+ year retention), EV battery digital passports (15-20 year battery lifecycle), and deforestation compliance records (EUDR 5-year minimum, extended for permanent farm records).

Claim 5 — Pharmaceutical Batch Manufacturing Record Embodiment (Dependent on Claim 3)
The system of Claim 3, applied to pharmaceutical manufacturing regulatory compliance, wherein:
(a) the measurement payload comprises one or more of: batch weight, yield percentage, pH measurement, assay result, dissolution test result, in-process control measurement, operator badge identifier, equipment calibration certificate hash, batch number, and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) step identifier;
(b) the hardware attestation event occurs at the moment of physical measurement by a Quality Assurance operator before any data entry into an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, Manufacturing Execution System (MES), or Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS);
(c) the compliance certificate constitutes a hardware-signed Batch Manufacturing Record (BMR) entry that is included by reference in regulatory submissions to the US Food and Drug Administration (21 CFR Part 11), European Medicines Agency (EU GMP Annex 11), or Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation of India (Schedule M);
(d) the blockchain-anchored certificate hash provides a tamper-evident audit trail satisfying data integrity requirements under 21 CFR Part 11 Section 11.10(e) without reliance on software-only audit logs that are retrospectively modifiable;
wherein the embodiment eliminates the category of pharmaceutical data integrity failures arising from manual ERP data entry after physical measurement, which constitute a primary basis for US FDA import alerts against Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers.

Claim 6 — Aerospace and Defence Component Provenance Embodiment (Dependent on Claim 3)
The system of Claim 3, applied to safety-critical aerospace and defence component manufacturing, wherein:
(a) the attestation device is integrated with or connects to a handheld measurement instrument including one or more of: a digital torque wrench, coordinate measuring machine (CMM) probe, material spectrometer, digital calliper, or non-destructive testing instrument;
(b) the measurement payload comprises one or more of: dimensional tolerance measurement, torque value, material composition spectrometric data, non-destructive test result, part serial number, operator certification number, equipment calibration certificate hash, work order number, and AS9100 process step identifier;
(c) the hardware attestation event occurs at the moment of physical measurement on the manufacturing shop floor or assembly line, not at a subsequent data entry workstation;
(d) the signed measurement record is linked to the component's digital twin and generates a machine-readable code on the physical part label, enabling verification at any subsequent point in the supply chain or maintenance lifecycle;
(e) non-conformance detection: a measurement payload whose signed values fall outside specification limits triggers an immediate cryptographically non-repudiable non-conformance record that cannot be retrospectively deleted or modified;
wherein the embodiment addresses the documented global problem of counterfeit safety-critical components by providing a hardware-signed provenance record from the moment of physical manufacture that is verifiable by any downstream operator without trusting the original manufacturer's software systems.

Claim 7 — EV Battery Digital Passport Embodiment (Dependent on Claim 3)
The system of Claim 3, applied to electric vehicle battery cell and pack manufacturing, wherein:
(a) the measurement payload comprises electrochemical formation data including one or more of: rated capacity (ampere-hours), internal resistance (milliohms), temperature profile during formation charge cycle, Coulombic efficiency, open circuit voltage, cycle count at formation, cell or pack serial number, cathode chemistry identifier, and formation facility identifier;
(b) the hardware attestation event occurs at the completion of the battery cell or pack formation process, creating a cryptographic birth certificate for the battery at the moment of its first verifiable electrochemical characterisation;
(c) the blockchain-anchored birth certificate constitutes a hardware-verified Battery Digital Passport entry compliant with requirements of EU Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, providing cryptographically verifiable formation history for second-life reuse assessment and end-of-life recycling compliance;
(d) at end-of-life, a battery tester can retrieve the birth certificate from the public blockchain and compare signed formation parameters with current measured state-of-health, enabling verifiable degradation assessment without dependence on the original manufacturer's database;
wherein the embodiment creates the foundational trust layer for a genuine second-life EV battery market based on verified formation history rather than manufacturer-claimed specifications.

Claim 8 — Multi-Sector Hardware Attestation Platform (Dependent on Claims 1, 2, 3)
A sector-agnostic hardware attestation platform implementing the device of Claim 1, method of Claim 2, and system of Claim 3, wherein:
(a) a single hardware device architecture, with sector-specific firmware profiles, serves multiple regulated industries by varying the measurement payload schema, compliance certificate template, regulatory context metadata, and backend verification logic while preserving the identical hardware signing, timestamp generation, and blockchain anchoring architecture;
(b) the platform exposes a commercial REST API service accepting a signed measurement payload and device identifier, performing signature verification, generating a compliance certificate, and anchoring the certificate hash on a public distributed ledger — enabling third-party application developers, compliance platforms, ERP vendors, and financial institutions to integrate hardware-rooted measurement attestation without building cryptographic or blockchain infrastructure independently;
(c) the post-quantum extension of Claim 4 is implemented platform-wide, such that all sector embodiments (Claims 5 through 7, and agricultural, fashion, and spirits embodiments described in the specification) benefit simultaneously from the transition to quantum-resistant signatures;
(d) the device registry, certificate store, and blockchain anchor architecture are shared across sector deployments, enabling cross-sector provenance verification — for example, a battery cell certificate can reference a mining provenance certificate from the same platform confirming the cathode material's origin;
wherein the platform constitutes an industry-horizontal hardware trust infrastructure applicable wherever physical measurements are the basis for regulatory compliance filings, quality certifications, or financial valuations.